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Notes and Comment
Carriers: Duty of steamship company where passenger dies on
board.-In Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N. Y. 249 (1917), the
defendant was engaged in the operation of a steamship line carrying
passengers between England and the United States. The father of
the plaintiff took passage on one of defendant's steamers and died on
the voyage. The body was embalmed and kept in a perfect state of
preservation four and a half days, and could have been carried into
port without injurious effect, but when within twenty hours of New
York, the port of destination, the body was cast into the sea. Ample
means to defray the expense of delivering the body at the port of
New York were in possession of the defendant, and plaintiff was at all
times ready and willing to satisfy any expense incident to the delivery
of the body to him for burial. The plaintiff was allowed to recover
on the ground that there was a common law duty upon the defendant
to transport the body to the dcstination of the steamer and deliver it
to the parties entitled to its possession, as long as the defendant had
embalmed the body and put it in such condition that it could have
been so delivered.
This action is a novel one, there being complete lack of precedent to
sustain it. At common law there was no right of property in a dead
body. This was so because of that respect and reverence which has
always been paid to a corpse. The doctrine seems to come from
Lord Coke in the decision of an early case,' and there is also evidence
of it in the writings of Blackstone. 2 The same doctrine seems to have
been followed in the ecclesiastical courtsa, but in this country it has
been accepted with marked qualifications. 3 Besides there was also
the duty to provide a decent burial to every person. 4 As was said in
an early English case, "There are many authorities which lay it down
that decent Christian burial is a part of a man's own rights; and we
think it no great extension of the rule to say, that it may be classed as
a personal advantage, and reasonably necessary to him."5 This duty
t

Haynes's Case, 6 Coke (Eng.) 355 (r655).
22 Bi. Com. (Lewis's ed.) 429.
2aSupra, notes i and 2.
3Note on Matter of Widening Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 503 (1857);
Foley v. Phelps, x App. Div. (N. Y.) 55I (1896), where the court said, "In more
recent times the obdurate common law rule has been very much relaxed, and
changed conditions of society, and the necessity for enforcing that protection which
is due to the dead, have induced courts to re-examine the grounds upon which the
common law rule reposed, and have led to modifications of its stringency." Also,
in Pierce v. The Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, io R. I. 227 (1872): "There
is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some
one toward the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect from
violation; * * * * itmaythereforebe considered asasort of quasiproperty,
and it would be discreditable in any system of law not to provide a remedy in
such
4 a case."
Reg. v. Stewart, I2 Ad. & Ell. (Eng.) 773 (1840); Chapple v. Cooper, .13 M. &
W. (Eng.) 252 (1844); Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (1875).
'Chapple v. Cooper, supra, note 4.
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has always been enforced in this country, being provided for by
statute in most of the states. 6
But was there any unlawful interference with the body of the
plaintiff's father in this ase which would give rise to an action for
damages? It has generally been held that, even though there is no
right of property (in the ordinary commercial use of the term) in a
dead body, certain persons may have rights to it and duties to perform
towards it The rights of relatives and friends to the solace and
comfort of burying the remains of a deceased person has been repeatedly recognized, and no violation of it will be tolerated." In the
principal case the defendant had embalmed the body of the deceased
so that it could very well have been carried to the port of destination
for delivery to the plaintiff. Then there was created a duty upon the
steamship company to deliver the body to the persons entitled to it.
There was no danger in the presence of the body on board the ship,
and no inconvenience was caused by it. So far as the facts of the case
show there was no duty upon the defendant to embalm thebody. The
contract between theparties doesnot showany such duty, and there was
none implied by law. But when the task of embalming it had been
undertaken and completed, and the body was in such condition that
it might have been easily kept on the steamer until arrival at a port,
then the law imposed a duty upon the defendant; and the plaintiff
was entitled to the legal possession of the body. The interference
with that right was an actionable wrong.9
The principal case does not stand, however, for the proposition
For example, see the statute in New York, which is similar to those throughout
the majority of the American jurisdictions; "Except in the cases in which a right
to dissect it is expressly conferred by law, every dead body of a human being,
lying within this state, must be decently buried within a reasonable time after
death."
PenalLaw, Sec. 2211.
7
A right of action has been sustained for an unauthorized dissection of a body
contrary to the wishes of relatives. Foley v. Phelps, supra, note 3; Darcy v.

Presbyterian Hospital, 202 N.Y. 259(I911); Burney v. Children's Hospital, r69
Mass. 57 (1897); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307 (1891): for retaining the organs

of a deceased person after an autopsy, without cons6nt, Hassard v. Lehane, 143
App. Div. (N. Y.) 424 (191 ); Koerberv. Patek, 123 Wis. 453 (to5), for mutilation of a body, Medical College of Georgia v. Rushing. i Ga. App. 468 (1907);
Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., 47 N. C. 394 (19o8). Also see N. Y. Penal Law, see.
2213, and N. Y. Public Health Law (Cons. Laws, Ch. 45) paragraphs 316, 317.
8Wright v. Cemetery
Corporation, 112 Ga. 884 (i9oi); Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 123 a. 62 (9o5); Bean v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 97
Ill. App. 24 (i9ox); Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536 (1890); Anderson v. Acheson, 132 Ia.. 744 (1907); Meyers v. Clarke, 12 Ky. 866 (196); Seaton v. Commonwealth, i49 Ky. 498 (19I2); Kanavan's Case, I Me. 226 (1821); Doxtator v.
Chicago. etc. R%.
R. Co., 12o Mich. 596 (I89); Foley v. Phelps, supra, note 3;
Cohen v. The Congregation, 85 App. Div. (N. Y. )6 (1903); Jackson v. Savage,
109 App. Div. (N. Y.) 556 (1905); Uarcy v. Presbyterian Hospital, supra,note 7.
9
The recent case of Deavors v. Southern Express CO., 76 So. (Ala.) 288(1917),

raised a question similar in many respects to that discussed in the principal case.
In that case the plaintiff sued the defendant carrier to recover damages for
negligence in the carrying of the corpse of plaintiff's brother, consigned to her in
Alabama and shipped from Kansas. Defendant had no agent at the place of
delivery and the coffin, containing the corpse, was placed on a truck and wheeled
under a shed, but was badly damaged from the rain blowing in and breaking
through the top. The Alabama court though denying recovery on other grounds
recognized the fact that there is a quasi legal right to dead bodies, although not
strictly a property right.

NOTES AND COMMENT
that all bodies of persons who die at sea must be delivered to relatives
on land. That fact was recognized by the Court of Appeals and discussed in the concurring opinion of Judge Pound, "But it cannot be
said that under ordinary circumstances the next of kin of a person
who dies on shipboard have such a legal right to the possession of the
body that they may recover damages because. the burial is at sea. A
decent committal of the body to the deep in accordance with the
custom in such matters ordinarily discharges the duty which the
law imposes."
William E. Vogel, 'zg.
Carriers: Liability for loss of baggage carried by passengers.-It
is a frequent practise among common carriers to place in their tariffs
a provision that articles of a certain type shall not be placed in baggage checked by passengers. The effect of such a rule is considered in
Borden v. The New York CentralR. R. Co., 98 Misc. (N. Y.) 574 (Z9Z7).
The plaintiff by mistake left some jewelry, which she was carrying
with her on an interstate trip, in the defendant's dining car. She soon
discovered the loss, and returned to claim the jewelry, but it had
disappeared, and was not recovered. She brought action against the
railway company for the loss of the jewlery; it appeared that in the
railway company's tariffs was the following clause: "Jewelry * * * *
should not be enclosed in baggage to be checked. The carriers issuing
and concurring in this tariff will not be responsible for such articles in
baggage." Under these circumstances, the passenger had kept the
jewelry in her own custody. In an extremely able opinion, Ransom,
J., decided that the effect of this rule was to put the defendant company in the position of insurer, and to make it absolutely liabie for
the loss of the property, provided that the plaintiff's own act did not
cause the loss. It was further held that the plaintiff's act in leaving
the jewelry in the dining car would not bar her recovery; or that, at
least, the jury should decide whether the passenger's act caused
the loss.
As the common law has developed, the common carrier is liable as
an insurer for goods carried, except where losses arise as follows:
from an act of God, from an act of a public enemy, from an act of a
public authority, from an act of the shipper, or from the inherent
nature of the goods.' This includes liability for baggage;2 but the
carrier may require that before its liability arises, the baggage shall be
given into its custody; and if opportunity for this is given, the
carrier is not an insurer when the property is not given into its
custody. 3 Baggage consists of "those articles of personal convenience
or necessity which the passenger takes with him, either for his immediate use or the ultimate purpose of the journey, and which are such
as persons of like habits and wants usually take with them for such
purposes when on similar journeys * * * .-4 The question here
was as to the measure of a carrier's liability for the loss of baggage
'Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.)

289.

23 Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.) 1473.

,io Corp. Jur. 1202, and cases there cited.
43 Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.) 1475.
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which it had refused to carry, and which was lost while in the passenger's custody. Rather strangely, this question seems never to have
arisen before in this country. In one English case' where the facts
were somewhat similar to those of the principal case, a like result
was reached.
The doctrine announced by the cou-t would seem to provide a
just solution of the question, which at first sight is a somewhat
puzzling one. Of course, in many cases, the question would arise
whether the article to which transportation was refused was properly
baggage at all; but the law on this point is fairly well settled, and
the practical value of the rule announced in the principal case would
not be thereby affected.
Richard H. Brown, 'g.
Constitutional Law: Admiralty jurisdiction and workmen's compensation acts.-While engaged in unloading in a New York port an
ocean-going steamship owned by a Kentucky corporation and plying
between ports of different states, a longshoreman was killed. Recovery
was allowed under the New York Compensation Act,' but upon appeal
the United States Supreme Court, by a decision of five to four, in the
case of Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524
(1917), reversed the award. The reversal was put on the ground that
any state legislation interfering with the harmony or uniformity of
the general maritime law in its interstate and international relations
is invalid, as being repugnant to the provisions of the Federal Constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the provisions of the
Judiciary Act giving the federal courts exclusive original cognizance
of all admiralty and maritime cases, though saving to suitors in all
cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it. The question arises whether the power of the
state to regulate by statute the liability of employers engaged in
ocean transportation between the states and enforce it in the state's
own courts is taken away by the conferring of exclusive jurisdiction of
all civil cases in admiralty upon the federal courts.
The general maritime law consists of rules and customs relating
to commerce and navigation that have grownup during past centuries,
with the legislation supplementary thereto. The rules applied in the
different jurisdictions vary somewhat but are generally similar.
Before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States the
jurisdiction to enforce maritime liens by proceedings in rein and to
determine the question of prizes captured in war were exclusively
cognizable in the admiralty.2 In civil actions in personam against
an individual defendant the courts of common law generally had
concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty courts.- It has been held
IMunster v. S. E. Ry. Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 676 (1858).

6Supra, note 4.

'Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N.Y. 514 (1915).

2Thc Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. (U, S.) 411 (1866); The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall.
(U.S.) 555 (1866); The Belfast, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 624 (2868); Steamboat Co. v.
Chase, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 522, 533 (1872); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 558
(1874).

3See cases cited supra, note 2.

NOTES AND COMMENT
that the lodging by the constitution of the entire admiralty power
in the Federal judiciary and the ninth section of the Judiciary Act,
with its saving of common law remedies, left the concurrent power of
the courts of common law and of admiralty where it stood at common
law; 4 and, it has been further held that statutory extensions of the
common law jurisdiction, supplementing the inadequate maritime
law, are valid.6
There is no doubt that Congress has paramount power to fix and
determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the
country.6 But until Congress by legislation assumes to change the
law it would seem that the states are at liberty to apply their own'
systems of law in those cases where they had concurrent jurisdiction
with the admiralty prior to the constitution. This would seem to
follow from the analogous situation which exists in regard to interstate
commerce. Congress was given power to regulate interstate commerce, but it was held that the states could legislate on many matters
pertaining thereto unless Congress undertook to cover the particular
field 7 When Congress manifested its intention to cover a field, its
legislation was exclusive and superseded state legislation on the same
subject.8 In Sherlock v. Ailing, 9 the court said "* * * * with
reference to a great variety of matters touching the rights and
liabilities of persons engaged in commerce, either as owners or navigators of vessels, the laws of Congress are silent and the laws of the
State govern." Thus in maritime matters it would seem that the
state courts still possess their common law jurisdiction and will
continue to do so until Congress sees fit to assume exclusive control
and take away the concurrent jurisdiction of the common law reserved
by the saving clause of the Judiciary Act.
It is well settled that the common law courts have jurisdiction
in personam against the owner of a vessel to redress a maritime tort.' 0
Since by the Judiciary Act a right is reserved to a common law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and since
Congress has not seen fit to bring every case which may be dealt with
under the admiralty law within its exclusive cognizance, but, on the
contrary, has allowed the states to legislate by statute concerning
4N. J. Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 344, 390 (1848);

Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. (U. S.) 583, 598 (1857); Steamboat Co. v. Chase
supra, note 2; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638 (1899); StoU v.
Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 2o5 Fed. 169 (1913); Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry &
Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303 (1915); Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn.
367 (1915).

5Sherlockv.Allin, g93 U.S. 99 (1876); Steamboat Co.v. Chase, supra,note 2;
Knapp,
(19o7) Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, supra, note 4; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398
GButler v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527 (1889); Re Garnett, 141 U. S. I,
147 (1890).
M Culloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (1819); Henderson v.
Mayor
of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1875); Michigan C. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland,
227 U. S. 59,66,67 (1912); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399 (912).
8
Erie R. R. Co.v. People of NewYork, 233 U.S. 67I (1914); seealso, cases cited
in supra, note 7.
'93 U. S. 99, 104 (1876).
'0Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 (189o); Leon v. Galceran, n1
Wall. 185 (1870); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, supra,note 2; The Hamilton, supra,
note 5.
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maritime torts, it is submitted that tl~e Worirmen's Compensation
Act is only a statutory change of the common law and that an
employee is none the less within the scope of the Workamen's Compensation Act because his employment is such as to bring him within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. n The view of the
majority of the court that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction of all
maritime cases and that this prevents the statutory change of the
common law from applying to a case like the present, seems to be
unwarranted in view of the decided cases, and the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Pitney in their dissenting
opinions seem to be more in accord with the spirit of previous decisions
touching upon the same subject.3
Harvey I. Tutchings, 'z8.
Constitutional Law: Impairment of contract: Power of a public
service commission to regulate rates of a public utility fixed by
franchise from municipality.--In People ex rel. New York &"North
Shore Traction Co. v. PublicService Commission, 175 App. Div. (N. Y.)
869 (rp96), it was held that the New York Public Service Commissions have power under section 49 of the Public Service Commission
Law to increase the rate of fare on railroads beyond that stipulated
in the consent of the local authorities under which the right to construct and operate was granted, since section 18 of article 3 of the
Constitution, requiring such consent, does not authorize the imposition of a condition which would deprive the Legislature through the
Commission of the right to exercise the general legislative power
vested in it by section i of the same article. This case now places the
Empire State on the side having the weight of authority, unless the
decision be reversed on appeal.
There seems to be no question that a valid franchise or charter
contract, made by a municipality or state with a public utility, governnKennerson
v. Thames Towboat Co., supra, note 4.
1
2Steamboat Co v. Chase, supra, note 2; The Hamilton, supra, note 5;
Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., supra, note 4.
It is interesting to note that the law in this particular has been changed since
the writing of this note by the following statute enacted on October 6, 1917,
making the law conform to the opinion of the minority of the court:
An Act to amend sections twenty-four and two hundred and fifty-six of the
Judicial Code, relating to the jurisdiction of the district courts, so as to save to
claimants the rights and remedies -under the workmen's compensation law of
any State.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That clause three of section twenty-four of the
Judicial Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen s compensation law of any State; of all seizures on land or waters not within
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; of all prizes brought into the United States;
and of all proceedings for the condemnationof property taken as prize."
SEC. 2. That clause three of section two hundred and fifty-six of the Judicial
Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State."

NOT9S AND COMMENT
ing rates or fares, would be protected by the constitutional provision
inhibiting the impairment of contracts. No less an authority than
the famous Dartmouth College case' stands for this proposition. But
before a court can be asked to determine whether a statute has
impaired the obligation of a contract, it should appear that there wa
a legal contract susceptible of impairment; a contract which is ultra
vires of a corporation, or subject to the will of the legislature,
not
2
being subject to impairment by subsequent legislation.
There is ample and high authority holding that the state may not
contract away the exercise of its police power. 3 But notwithstanding
these precedents, and though it is universally recognized that rate
regulation is properly within the sphere of the exercise of the police
power, there may be found decisions apparently holding that the
state may contract away by specific agreement its right and power to
regulate rates. 4 The only satisfactory explanation of this inconsistency would seem to be that the state has not yet awakened to the
full realization of its responsibilities and rights concerning this recent
development of its police power.
A question more pertinent is whether contracts between municipalities and public utilities, which attempt to fix rates, are so subject to
the will of the legislature that they may be changed without unconstitutionally impairing the contracts. The great weight of authority
answers in the affirmative, though various reasons are given for
reaching this conclusion.
Some cases uphold the public service commissions' rate-making
power, as against contracts fixing rates, on the ground that the
municipality, being a mere creature and agent of the state, has no
more power to contract than has been delegated to it; and any act
beyond this delegated power is unauthorized and of no avail against
the inherent, undivested powers of the State acting through the commission. 5 All the authorities unite in holding that any delegation of
power to fix rates claimed by the municipality must be clearly conferred.6
Another theory, and the one most prevalent, by which the state
through its legislature or commissions reserves to itself the power to
regulate rates, is based upon the hypothesis that, though the parties
may contract as to rates when the municipality gives its consent to
construct, 7 yet they must have contracted with a view to, or with the
implied stipulation that the state reserves the power to regulate the
14

Wheat. (U. S.) 518 (1819).

2
New
3

Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U. S. 79 (1891).
Beer Company v. lvassachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877); Walla Walla City v.
Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1 (1898); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. State of
Minn. ex rel. City of Duluth, 2o8 U. S. 583 (19o8); Texas & New Orleans R. R.
Co. v. Miller, 221 U. 9. 408 (I911).
4
Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 2o6 U. S. 496, 508 (1907); Collection
of cases in 33 L. R. A. 186; Reeder, Validity of Rate Regulation, sec. 197.
5
Tempe v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R. (Ariz.) 1915D, 716, 723;
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 26.5 (719o8).
OSee annotation, P. U. R. 19i6C, 492.
7
City of Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co., 145 Wis. 13 (1911).
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rates as it shall see fit." And this is held to be so whether the contract
is executed prior to or subsequent to legislation fixing and declaring
the rate-making power of the state.9
In Woodburn v. Public Service Commission, 0 it was said: "If the
franchise is deemed to be a contract between the city and telephone
company, then the mere fact that it was made prior to the enactment
of the public utility statute and before the state attempted to regulate
the rates, does not debar the state from increasing the rates fixed in
the contract between the parties, for the reason that the law wrote
into it a stipulation by the city that the state could, at any time,
exercise its police power and change the rates; and therefore, when
the state does exercise its police power, it does not work an impairment of any obligation of the contract. The immediate parties to
the franchise must contract with reference to the right of the government to exercise its inherent authority. The governed cannot, by
contract, forestall the resuscitation of a dormant police power by the
government; and therefore, unless the state actually divested itself
of the right to exercise its police power, the agreement by which the
city and company specified the rates was made subject to the right
of the state to change them."
It has been contended that even though the state may fix the rates
to be charged by a public utility by virtue of its police power, yet a
contract, valid at its inception, is not subject to abrogation by subsequent legislation. In Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light and
W. Co." it was held that this contention could not be sustained, the
court saying: "The rule is that contracts upon subjects which are
within the police power, even though valid when made, must be taken
to have been entered into in view of the continuing power of the state
to control the rates to be charged by public service corporations."
A Washington case,n which is regarded as a leading case on this
subject, treats an ordinance of a city, granting to a telephone company a franchise which fixes rates not as a binding agreement but in
the nature of a license and permissive only, subject to the exercise of
the sovereign power of the state.
From these quotations and abstracts which are quite representative
of the recent decisions on this subject, a fairly clear deduction of the
present law in respect to this topic may be drawn. Generally, it
would seem that no contract executed by a municipality and a public
service corporation, attempting to regulate rates of a utility, can
withstand the power of the legislature, acting itself or through a commission, when exercised to change the rates specified in the contract
8

Woodburn v.

Public

Service Commission, 82 Ore. 114,

121

(8916); In re

Rhinelander Power Co., P. U. R. (Wis.) 19i5A, 652; Hollister v. Hollister Water
Co., P. U. R. (Cal.) 1915D, 626; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U.?
57 (x898); Adams v. Dakota Central Tel. Co., P. U. R. (S. Dak.) z986F, 575;
Chicago v. O'Connell (ILl) I6 N. E. 210 (T9).
sSausalito v. Marin Water & Power Co., P. U. R. (Cal.) 19 i6A, 244; Woodburn
v. Public Service Commission, supra,note 8; City of Benwood v. Public Service
Commission, 75 W. Va.

127

(1914).

2OSupra, note 8.
"92 Wash. 330, 335 (I916), and cases there cited.
"State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court for King County et al., 67 Wash. 37
Note, L. R. A. 1915C, 287.

(1912);
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as it sees fit; the basic principle underlying this attitude being that
the legislature or commission in so doing is making proper use of a
police power from which no unconstitutional impairment of the contract can result, even though the contract is valid when made as
between the municipality and the company. An apparent exception
to this general rule exists where there has been a clearly expressed
delegation of the rate-making power to the municipality. The
principal case goes upon the ground that the municipality was never
so authorized to enter into a rate-making contract. It is submitted
that the correct result was reached, in view of the weight of authority
and on principle.
Frederic M. Hoskins, '.rg.
Constitutional Law: Minimum wage legislation.-The constitutionality of minimum wage legislation has finally been upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Stettler v. O'Hara,
37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475 (19r7), though the affirmance of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Oregon in Stettler v. O'Hara was without an
opinion, and by an evenly divided court.2 The statutein questionwas
passed in 1913 and provided, among other things, that "it shall be
unlawful to employ women in any occupation within the State of
Oregon for wages which are inadequate to supply the necessary cost
ot living and to maintain them in health." The amount of such wage
was to be determined by a commission which also had authority to
grant licenses permitting under payment in certain cases. The
plaintiff Stettler, a paper box manufacturer, refused to obey the order
of the commission and brought this suit to enjoin its enforcement.
The complaint was denied upon demurrer, and decrees dismissing it
were upheld by the Supreme Court of Oregon, whereupon Stettler
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, claiming chiefly
that the statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
There has been considerable dispute as to the constitutionality of
any attempt to legislate in respect to wages. Pilot fees have been the
subject of regulation for some time.2 Statutes fixing the time of
payment have usually been upheld,4 while in respect to those determining the method of payment the courts have been by no means harmonious.5 The fixing of wages for unskilled labor on all public works
at not less than a specified sum has been held unconstitutional,5 but
in the case of Atkin v. Kansas,7 such a statute was upheld, chiefly
'69 Ore. 519 (1914).
'Mr. Justice Brandeis not voting. He, however, undoubtedly believes in the
constitutionality of the statute.
sEx parte McNiel, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236 (1871).

'Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Co., 45 Wash.
Arkansas Stave Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27 (1910).

290

(1907);

5State v. Minor, 33 W. Va. 179 (1889), where a statute providing that employee
must be paid in negotiable funds was held unconstitutional; see also, in accord,
State v. Missouri Tie and Timber Co., 181 Mo. 536 (i9o4); but see, contra,
Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Co., supra, note 4.
OStreet v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., x6o Ind. 338 (1903); Mallette v.
Spokane, 68 Wash. 578 (1912).
7191 U.

S. 207 (1903).
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because of the peculiar relation which a municipal corporation bears
toward the state. In New York State similar statutes were formerly
held unconstitutional, 8 but at present such legislation is provided for
by the Constitution. 9
The chief argument aimed against the minimum wage laws is under
that part of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits any state
from making a law which shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." It would seem that such
legislation as that under discussion does technically impair the liberty
of contract, but statutes have often been upheld where such interference was necessary for the public good, i. e., to protect the life,
health, and morals of a community and to prevent fraud. 10 As stated
by Justice Holmes ""the liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long
as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same
* * * * is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by
every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not."
Getting away from technicalities, the real liberty which the statute
in question seeks to impair is the liberty of the employer to require the
employee to accept less than a living wage. Is such legislation "a
fair, easonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
State, or is it an.unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into
those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate
or necessary for the support of himself and his family?" 12 In fact,
without such legislation is there real freedom of contract when
economic conditions compel the laborer to sell nis labor for less than
the labor costs, measuring such cost by the minimum cost of living?
But, as pointed out in the admirable brief for the defendant in
error, 3 minimum wage legislation is not passed only for the benefit of
employees. A contract which calls for less than a living wage involves
not only the employer and the wage-earner but also the state. The
deficit, i. e., the difference between the amount paid and that required
to sustain the wage-earner, must come from some part of the public.
In the words of the defendant's counsel, "a contract for labor below
its cost must inevitably rely upon a subsidy from outside. To
the extent of this subsidy the public is necessarily concerned;
* * * * the State has, therefore, a special right to impose conditions upon which the industry or the employee may enjoy the subsidy
or even to refuse it absolutely."
Finally, it is a fundamental principle that a legislative enactment is
never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question,
TPeople v. Coler, 166 N. Y. i (igoi); but see Ryan v. New York,177 N. Y. 271
(1904), where the same statute was held constitutional.
9New York State Constitution, Art. 12, see. I, as amended.
2°Health: Charleston v. Werner, 38 S. C. 488 (1892). Morals: Akh Sin v.
Wittman, 198 TT.S. 5oo (i9o5). Fraud: People v. Freeman, 242 Ill. 373 (1909).
"Lochner
v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905).
'2 Test laid down in Lochner v. New York, supra,note ii.
"Compiled by Felix Frankfurter, Counsel for the Industrial Welfare Commission, and Josephine Goldmark, Publication Secretarv of the National Consumers'
League. Part 2 of the brief was prepared under -the direction of Mr. Justice
Brandeis before his appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power.1' Maximum hour
laws have been upheld, 15 chiefly because they aim to preserve the
public health. But a living wage is as vital to the health of the wageearner as the number of hours he may work. Inadequate wages were
shown to have a pernicious effect upon the health and morals of the
community, and it was to remedy these conditions that the legislature
of Oregon passed the statute in .question. It would seem unreasonable to hold this to be "plainly and palpably in excess of legislative
power.$*
W. J. Gilleran, 'W8.
Constitutional Law: Scope of the Federal. Employers' Liability
Act.-The uncertainty which has arisen as to the scope of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, which imposes a liability on employers for
injuries or death to employees employed in interstate commerce where
the employer is at fault, has been considerably cleared away by two
decisions of much importance and significance by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the cases of New York Central R. R. Co. v.
Winfid, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546 (x917)', and Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield,
37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556 (1x97)2. The two cases are similar in their
facts, in the former an employee of a common carrier being injured,
and in the latter case an employee being killed, while engaged in
interstate commerce without causal negligence attributable to either
party. The state courts held that the Federal Act was not applicable
where there was no negligence on the part of the employer, but applied
the state compensation act which awards compensation without
regard to negligence, on the ground that the nature and purposes of
the two acts are different and that Congress did not intend that the
Federal Act should be exclusive. The principal cases, which are the
first expressions by the Supreme Court on the particular question,*
hold that the entire field of employers' liability to employees injured
or killed in interstate commerce is so completely covered by the
provisions of the Federal Act as to prevent any award under the state
acts. The Federal Act, it holds, is as comprehensive of injuries
occurring without negligence, as to which class it impliedly excludes
liability, as it is of those injuries for which it imposes liability, on the
ground that it makes negligence a test, not of the applicability of the
act, but of the employers' duty to respond pecuniarily for the injury.
The subject of employers' liability and workmen's compensation
is comparatively recent and the Federal Act is the answer of Congress
to the demand for corrective legislation to remedy some of the
injustices of the common law rules of liability between master and
servant which have arisen from our complex industrial conditions.
That act and the workmen's compensation acts of the various states
are so closely related that two conflicting views have arisen as to the
1

Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 (1878); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S.

18316 (!9oo).

Wilson v. New, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep.

298 (1917),

discussed in
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'Decision in Matter of Winfield v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 216 N.Y. 284
(09T5),commented upon in I CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 272, iS reversed.
2Winfield v. Erie R. R. Co., 88 N. J. L. 619 (i926).
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scope of the Federal Act, New York' and New Jersey4 contending that
the Federal Act does not cover the entire field, while Illinois5 and California 6 have strongly maintained that the Federal Act is exclusive.
It is well settled that Congress has power to regulate interstate
commerce. As to those subjects which require a general system of
uniformity of regulation, the power of Congress is exclusive. In
other matters, admitting of diversity of treatment according to the
special requirements of local conditions, the states may act within
their respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act; and, when
Congress does act, the exercise of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation. 7 Whether Congress intended to cover the
entire field of employers' liability to their employees in interstate
commerce must be decided from the statute and the circumstances
which led to and surrounded its passage. When Congress passed the
act there were no state acts on the subject. It was desired to enact a
uniform law, applicable alike to every state, and to withdraw such
injuries from the operation of varying state laws.8 The question of
imposing a liability without regard to negligence was considered when
the bill was before the Senate for consideration and it was rejected,
Congress seeing fit, in its discretion, to exact compensation only
where the employer was negligent. 9 Although there are no express
words in the act declaring that its operation shall be exclusive as to
injuries received in interstate commerce, it was decided nearly a century ago, and has been repeatedly reiterated, that, "if Congress have a
constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do
actually regulate it in a given manner, and in a certain form, it cannot
be said that the state legislatures have a right to interfere, and, as it
were, by way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations, and what they may deem auxiliary
provisions for the same purpose. In such a case, the legislation of
Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates, that it does
not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the
subject matter. Its silence as to what it does not do, is as expressive of
what its intention is as the direct provisions made by it."10
3Matter of Winfield v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., supra,note i.
4Winfield v. Erie R. R. Co., supra,note 2.
5Staley v. Ill. C. R. R. Co., 268 Ill. 356 (I915).
'Smith
v. Industrial Commission, 26 Cal. App. 56o (i9x5).
7
M'Culloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (i819); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 271 (1875); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465,
473 (1888); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Pd R. R. Co. v. Hefley, x58 U. S. 98 (1895);
Michigan C. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 66, 67 (3912); The Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399 (1912); N. C. R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248
(93:,); Eric R. R. Co. v. People of New York, 233 U. S. 67 1 (1914).
'Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1,51, 56 (1912); House Rep.
No. 3386 and Sen. Rep. No. 46o, 6oth Cong., ist Sess.
9Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 501 (1914): Report of
Committee on Education and Labor, Sen. Rep. 46o, 6oth Cong. Ist Sess., in Vol. 2
U. S. Doc. 5219 at p. 2. Several years later it was sought to amend the act so as
to give a remedy to the employee regardless of the question of negligence, but the
attempt was unsuccessful. Sen. Rep. 553, 62nd Cong. 2nd Sess., and House Rep.
I44I, 62nd Cong. 3d Sess.

"'Prigg. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters (U. S.) 539, 617
(Italics are the writer's); Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat (U. S.) i, 21, 23,

(3842),
(1820).
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In the case of the Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.v. Wulf" it was said
that even if the petition in a suit against an interstate carrier for the
death of one engaged in interstate commerce asserts a cause of action
under the state statute, without referring to the Federal Act, the
court is presumed to be cognizant of the Federal Act, and of the fact
that it has superseded state laws upon the subject. In the Vreeland"2
case it was said that if a liability does not exist under the Employers'
Liability Act it does not exist by virtue of any state legislation upon
the same subject.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a strong dissenting opinion in which Mr.
Justice Clarke concurred, reviews the origin, scope and purpose of
employers' liability, and the nature, method and means of workmen's
compensation, enumerates the cases where no remedy could be had
under the Federal Act and concludes that the act is so narrow as to
preclude the belief that Congress intended to deny the state the power
to provide compensation or relief for injuries not covered by it. In
view of the fact that Congress chose to enter the field and evidenced
its intention to make the employer responsible only where he was
negligent, it seems that the interpretation by the New York and New
Jersey courts is an unreasonable restriction of the Federal Act, and
that the principal cases are correctly decided by the United States
Supreme Court. However desirable may be the result striven for in
the dissenting opinion, effect must be given to the intention of
Congress and the remedy must be found by application to that body.
Harvey I. Tutchings, 'x.
Contempt: Punishment of act committed out of state.--The
question whether the courts of one state have power to pumsh for
contempt, acts committed in another, was raised in Farmers' State
Bank of Texhoma v.State, z64 Pac. (Okla.) 132 (1917). The Oklahoma
court enjoined the defendant from selling or disposing of certain
property, a portion of which was situated in the state of Texas. The
defendant who was found guilty of indirect contempt in disposing of
the property, contended that contempt is criminal in nature and since
all acts constituting the contempt were committed in Texas, the
Oklahoma court had no jurisdiction to punish. The court distinguishes between contempt and other criminal acts, stating that the
latter are offences against the peace and dignity of the state, hence the
jurisdiction to try and punish for such offences is placed alone in the
particular state and county against which the offence has been committed. Contempt is an offence against the dignity and authority
of the particular court to which the affront is offered. Such court can
take action or not, but if the court has jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter out of which an indirect contempt grows, the
affront is none the less directly against the dignity and authority of
that court, no matter to what county or state the offender may go to
violate the order. It makes no difference as to the character of the
property whether real or personal or where it is situated; if the court
has power to enjoin its sale, a violation of that order wherever com"Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. v. Wulf,
2

226 U.S. 570, 576 (i912).
1 Michigan C. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, note 7.
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mitted is an offence against the court and that court alone has power
to punish regardless of the place to which the contemnor may have
gone to violate the order.
No authorities are cited in the case, and while the question seems to
be one *hich might frequently have arisen, there seem to be few cases
in point. In Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince'sMetallic Paint Co.,' a New
York court enjoined the defendant from using a trade mark of the
plaintiff. Acts in violation of the order were committed in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts and the court held that, having acquired
jurisdiction of the action and issued an injunction therein, it might
punish its violation although the parties were both non-residents and
part of the acts complained of were done without the state. This
case has apparently never been overruled nor has it been cited in other
cases. A decree was given also in Kempson v. Kempson,2 enjoining the
defendant from bringing a divorce action in the courts of a foreign
state and upon his continuance of the action the same court punished
him for contempt.
To determine the soundness of the doctrine laid down in the
principal case, since there is little direct authority to support it, it
seems necessary to examine the nature of contempt and the power of
the courts over extraterritorial matters. As pointed out, while
contempt isgenerallyclassifiedasa crime, there is a distinction between
it and other crimes, contempt being an offence against the particular
court, while other crimes are offences against the peace and dignity of
the state or county where committed. This distinction seemssound
and to justify
the classification of contempt by some courts as quasicriminal. 4 Again it is divided into civil and criminal contempt, " and
by some as being of a dual nature."
That the power of the courts to punish for contempt is inherent,
and not conferred by the constitution or legislature, is well supported
by authority. 7 Logically following these decisions, it has been held
that the legislature has no authority to take away such power of the
courts," though it may sometimes regulate it. 9 This inherent power
151 Hun (N. Y.) 443 (1889).
258 N. J. Eq. 94 (1899).

261 N. J. Eq. 303 (1901).
Bishop, New Crim. Law, 8th ed., sec.

4

24 Fed. 780, 783 (885);

242-a-i;

see United States v. Berry,

Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257 (1876), that an
act denying criminal jurisdiction to a court does not take away power to punish
for contempt, and that the latter is not properly a criminal proceeding.
'Phllips v. Welch, ix Nev. 187 (1876), civil and criminal contempt defined;
State ex rel. Edwards v. Davis, a N. Dak. 46! (I892), criminal contempt defined.
'State cx inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 232 (1903); Graham v. WilliamSon,
Tenn. 720 2a8
(19(3).
74 Blackstone's Corn. (Lewis's Ed.) 284-288; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat.
(U. S.) 204. 227 (182!); Ex parle Robinson, 19 WalL (U. S.) 505, 510 (1873);
People v. Tool, 35 CoL 225 (1905); Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238 (1873);
Yates v. Lansing 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 395 (18 1); Graham v. Williamson, supra,
note 6.
ORapalje, Contempts, sec. i; In re Ellerbee, 13 Fed. 530 (1882), holding
that this power of the courts is inherent and that sec. 725 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States is declaratory of this power; State v. Morril, x6 Ark. 384
(1855); Middlebrook v. State, supra, note 4; People v. Wilson, 64 IL 95 (1872);
Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196 (187); State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, sufwa,
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of the courts to punish for contempt arises from necessity: first, to
command respect for the judicial system;10 and, secondly, to enforce
decrees of the courts. It is necessarily incident to the latter power. u
The extent of such power of the courts is curiously vague,12 especially in relation to extraterritorial matters, since there is much division
of authorities as to when such litigation can and should be adjudicated
in a domestic court. It isusually considered on the ground of policy
and comity." Three things are held necessary for a court to have
punishing power in contempt: (x) jurisdiction of the parties; (2)
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, and (3) power to render
judgment in the action. 4 It is quite generally held that each court
must punish its own contempt.5
The courts have acquired a limited jurisdiction in extraterritorial
matters, among them being power to restrain the bringing of actions
in foreign courts, 6 and the enforcement of judgments acquired in a
foreign jurisdiction, 7 to enjoin the commission of foreign torts,"' to
compel transfer of land and do other acts in duties arising from trust,
fraud or contract," and to restrain foreign proceedings in evasion of
domestic legislation. 20 Whether or not decrees have been given in
note 6; State ex rd.a.Atty. Gen. v. Cir. Ct. for Eau Claire Co., 97 Wis. i (1897);

but see contra, Thomas, Constructive Contempt 16, that the legislature has power
to control and restrain.
'Grahamv. Williamson, supra, note 6.
"ntdSae

v. Ne

Befr

Brd.

Wod.o
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(U S.4o
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Mowrr
07 v Stte,
d. 39 i886; se, atesv. ansngsup-a, note 7;
Boo 6v.Mc~cke,
Hu (NY.)251(183),forappicaionof ec 14 of N. Y.

Code Ci. Proc., giving courts power to punih contempts. But see, Noyes v.
Byxbee, 45 Conn.38a (1877); Brown. Davidson, 59 Ia. 461 (2882); Rutherford
v. Holmes, 66 N. Y. 368 (1876); Matter of Watsonv. Nelson, 69 N.Y. 536 (1877),

for powers of the lesser judicial officers.
nEx parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888).
"See post, note 21.
"4Ez parte Coffee, 72 Tex. Grim, Rep. 209 (1913).
"Hines v. Rawson, 40 Ga. 356 (1869);, Hayden v. Phinzy, 67 Ga. 758 (1881);
Watson v. Williams, su~pra, note io; Ex parte Chamberlain, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 49
(1825); Prince Mfg, Co. v. Prince's Metalic Paint Co., supra, note i; Pcnn Jr. v.
Messinger, i Yeates (Pa.) 2 (1791).
'2 Story Eq. Juris., sec. 899, 9oo; Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 Mylne & Keen
(Eng.) io 4 (1834); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890), holding that such
power is constitutional; Great Falls Mfg. Co..v. Worster, 23 N. H. 462 (i85T);

Locomobile Co. v. Am. Bridge Co., 8o App. Div. (N. Y.) 44 (19o3). But see
contra,Jones v. Hughes, 156 Ia. 684 (1912); Harrisv.Pulhnan, 84 11. 20 (1876).
And see, Mead v. Merrit, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 402 (1831), that court will enjoin the
starting of an action but not one already started. For full discussion of this
subject see, 9 Col. Law Rev. 80.
"Stevens,. at. v. Cent. Nat. Bank, x44 N. Y. 5o (1894); Davis v. Cornue, x51
N. Y. 172 (z896); Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., x67 N. Y. 348 (1901).
"Frank v. Peyton, 82 Ky. x5o (1884); Alexanderv. Tollestoni Club, 11o I11. 65
(1884); Baker v. Rockabrand, 1i8 Ill. 365 (x886); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Worster, supra, note 16. But see, contra,Atlantic &P. Tel. Co. v. B. &0. R. R.,
46 N. Y. Super. Ct. 377 (i88o).
"See 2 Co]. Law Rev. 51; Dale et al. v. Roosevelt, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 173 (1821);
Ward v. Arrendondo, xHopk. (N. Y.) 213 (182A); D'Ivernois v. Leavitt, 23 Barb.
(N. Y.) 63 (1856); Gardner v. Odgen, 22 N. Y. 327 (i86o); Sloan v. Baird, 162
N. Y. 327, 331 (19o).

"OColev. Cunningham, supra,note x6; Reynolds v. Adden, 136 U.S. 348 (z889).
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these cases, has usually depended on the equities of the case on the one
hand, and policy 21
and comity to be pursued toward another jurisdiction on the other.
It is a general rule of equity that it will not decree what it cannot
enforce." Since in these cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it has
made decrees, it must logically follow that the power to punish for
contempt, a violation of its decrees, is incident to its power to make
the decrees." To hold contrary to this principle would be to make a
large and necessary part of the work of the courts of equity a mere
farce. For example, as pointed out in the principal case, a decree of a
court, enjoining the sale of personal property which was within the
jurisdiction of a court having proper control of the parties, could
easily be avoided by going across the state line to sell.
It is submitted, therefore, that the decision of the principal case was
sound in legal principle, and that the recognition of the authority
there exercised is necessary in manycases to the working out of practical justice.
Ralph L. Emmons, 'i8.
Criminal Law: False pretenses: Professional services as
"valuable things."-The case of State v. Ball, 75 So. (Miss.) 373
(xpx7), was a criminal prosecution under the statute relating to false
pretenses.' The defendant, with the intention of defrauding one
Doctor Magee, told the doctor that he had a cow, and that if he did
not pay the doctor by a certain date for professional services rendered
or to be rendered1 the doctor should have the cow. In fact, Ball had
no such cow and the whole story was made up for the purpose of
deceiving the doctor. In this, Ball was successful, and obtained
professional services which otherwise the doctor would not have
rendered. The claim of the defense was that the professional services of a physician were not "valuable things" under the statute.
The court, however, held that the services were "valuable things,"
placing its decision on the ground that the legislature in using this
term meant to include all possible subjects of the offense, and not
limit it merely to tangible personal property; and saying further that
the physician's stock in trade, his services, should be no more liable
to be taken by false pretenses than should the goods of a merchant.
It might be asked whether, the offense being punishable by imprisonment, this decision did not violate the provision of the state consti2aExercised: Mead v. N. Y. Co., 45 Conn. i99 (l877); Eaton v. McCall, 86
Me. 346 (894); Burgess v. Smith, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 276 (x847); Locomobile
Co. v. Am. Bridge Co., supra, note 16; Willey v. Decker, ii Wyo. 496 (1903).
Should not be exercised: M. & M. R. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black (U. S.) 485 (x862);
Wimer & Wife v. Wimer and als., 8a Va. 89o (1886).
22See 16 Cyc. ix8, and see, Ward v. Arredondo, supra, note i9.
"United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 3-2 (i812); Clark v. People, I Ill.
340 (183o); State v. Mathews, 37 N. H. 450 (1859); Yates v. Lansing, supra,
note 7. See also, Burnham v. Morrisey, 14 Gray (Mass.) 226 (1859); Cunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 47 (1886).
'Mississippi, Code of 19o6, see. x66: "Every person who, with intent to cheat
or defraud another, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or by
any other false pretense, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtain from any person any money, personal property, or valuable thing,
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished
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tution prohibiting imprisonment for debt.2 It would seem not, for
on this ground attacks have sometimes been made on the constitutionality of laws making it a crime to obtain board and lodging by false3
pretenses, and these attempts have been uniformly unsuccessful.
The courts base their decisions on the ground that the punishment is
for the fraud used in the creation of the debt, and not for the debt
itself or its creation. The same reasoning would applytotheprincipal
case.
It is, however, questionable whether the criminal law should be
used for the purpose of collecting a debt for personal or professional
services of any sort; and it is seemingly on this ground that it has
been held in another jurisdiction that obtaining a doctor's services by
false pretenses is not a criminal offense. 4 In some states, there are
statutory provisions that the purchase of property by means of a
false pretense relating to the purchaser's means or ability to pay is not
criminal unless the pretense is made in writing and signed by the
party to be charged.A A judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
referring to this law as it appears in the New York Penal Law, said:
"This was doubtless dictated by the knowledge that criminal charges
of false pretenses are often instituted in reality to compel the payment of debt, and are easily fabricated."8
The principal case, however, would seem to be at least a warranted
construction of the statute in question, and it is probable that as to
that particular defendant, there was no great miscarriage of justice.
Richard H. Brown, 'r9.
Domestic Relations: Marriage: Annulment for duress: Legitimacy of offspring and relation back of the annulment decree.-In
Houle v. Houle, zoo Misc. (N. Y.) 28 (ixz7), it was shown thet after
the birth of a child of which the plaintiff was the father, the mother
coerced him by threats of bodily violence, to be inflicted by her
brother, to go through the form of a marriage ceremony. The
evidence showed further that the plaintiff and defendant had not
lived together or cohabited as husband and wife. The court held
that upon these facts the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of annulment on the ground that his consent to the marriage was procured
under duress; that the child had become legitimated by the marriage,2 and that its status in that regard was not affected by the subsequent annulment of the marriage. "A very important distinction,"
the court tells us, "exists between a void and a voidable marriage.
In the former case the marriage is void ab initio. It never was a
marriage. * * * * In the case of a voidable marriage, the
marriage is legal until annulled by the courts, andit only becomes void
1

Const. of Miss., see.

30.

'Ex parte King, 102 Ala 182 (1893); Hutchinson'v. Davis, 58 Ill. App. 358

(1895); State v. Benson, 28 Minn. 424 (x881); State v. Yaidley, 95 Tenn. 546
(1895).
4Ex parleWheeler, 7 Okla. Cr. 562 (1912).
6New York Penal Law, sec. 947.

$Cullen, J. in People ex rel. Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 187 (1902).
IN. Y. Dom. Rel. L, sec. 7, subdiv. 4, and sec. 175o, N. Y. Code of Civ. Proc,
2N. Y. Doam. Rel. L., secs. 7 and 24.
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from the time its nullity is determined by the judgment of the
court. * * * * The legality of the marriage status and of all
the consequences ordinarily flowing therefrom, from the time the
voidable marriage relationship began until its annullment, is undisturbed. "4
In enunciating this broad doctrine that in New York a decree
annulling a marriage, which previous to the decree was merely voidable, has no relation back whatever, the court rests almost solely
upon the provision of the Domestic Relations Law which declares
that such a marriage, as is therein specified as voidable, is "void from
the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction" .6
for the court is careful to call attention to the fact that there is in the
Code of Civil Procedtire no clause expressly saving the legitimacy of
children born under a voidable marriage subsequently annulled for
duress.
At common law a decree annulling a voidable marriage for any
cause relates back and makes the marriage void ab initio. The
situation after the decree is rendered is the same as though there had
been no marriage at all. The children born prior to the decree
become bastards. The parties to the marr'age lcse all rights to each
others property. Bishop says, "The doctrine has sometimes a limit
under the operation of a statute, but it appears to be universal under
the unwritten law, that, when a voidable marriage is set aside by a
decree of nullity, the parties are regarded as never having been
married.. For example, the children, before legitimate, become, by
force of the decree, illegitimate." 7
The doctrine of the principal case, in so far as it indicates the
statutory modifications of the common law rule in New York" in this
matter, must at least be confined and limited strictly to its facts.
The case of Jones v. BrinsrnadeOshows that an annulment decree in
the case of a marriage voidable because, at the time the marriage contract was entered into, the husband was incapable of consenting
through want of understanding, does relate back, and, in the absence
of express statutory provision to the contrary, does have the same
effect that such a decree would have at common law. This was
declared in spite of the provision that such a marriage is "void from
the time its nullity is declared by -a court of competent jurisdiction." 9
It may be contended that this case stands only for the proposition
that in an action for the annulment of an alleged voidable marriage
brought by the wife against the husband the plaintiff cannot be
awarded alimony pendente lite or counsel fees. But in deciding this
question the court took the position that if the decree were granted it
would relate back and invalidate the entire marriage contract, and
3ltalics are the writer's.
'Houle
v. Houle, ioo Misc. (N. Y.) 28, 29 (1917).
6
N. Y. Dom Rel. L., sec. 7.
6Aughtie v. Aughtie, x Phillimore (Eng.) 201 (x81o); Spencer, Law of Doam.
Rel., sec. 328; 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, sects. 260 ed seg.,
271, 272, 277, and cases there cited.
71 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, sec. 277.
'183 N.Y. 258 (19o.5), reversing 1o4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 619.
ssupra,note 5.
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that the wife would be in the inconsistent position of bringing an
action to have the contract declared void and at the same time claiming rights which would accrue to her only if the contract were valid.
Moreover, the court in Jones v. Brinsrnade expressly disapproved the
case of Gore v. Gore."0 In that case the court allowed alimony pendente life and counsel fees to the wife bringing action against her
husband for annulment on the ground of impotency. The court in
the Gore case held that the decree, if granted, would not relate back,
and that the right to such alimony and fees would accrue to the wife
before the decree was rendered, so there could be no inconsistency
in making such an award.
The earlier case of Price v.Price" also casts doubt upon the court's
interpretation in Houle v. Houle of the statutory provision that a
voidable marriage is "void from the time its nullity is declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction, 1 2 as meaning that the decree acts
prospectively and not retrospectively. In the Price case, the marriage was annulled because the wife at the time of the marriage had a
former husband living, who had absented himself for five successive
years prior to the second marriage, and during all that time was not
known to the wife to be living. The wife claimed dower in all the real
property owned by the second husband at the date of the annulment
decree. The court held that she was not entitled to such dower,
taking the position that the annulment decree left the parties in the
same position that they were before the marriage under the common
law, and that in New York there were no statutes expressly saving the
right of dower in such case.
The above cases seem to indicate that the decision in Houle v. Houle
is questionable even when confined strictly to its facts. We have
provisions in the New York statutes expressly saving the legitimacy
of offspring of voidable marriages where the action to annul is brought
on the ground that one party or the other had a former spouse living
at the time of the second marriage, who had been absent five years
prior to such marriage and was not known to be living during that
time.13 There are also clauses saving the legitimacy of the offspring
of a voidable marriage where the action for annulment is brought on
the ground that one party or the other was mentally incapable of
giving consent to the marriage contract, or where one party was
14
In the case of
below the age of consent at the time of the marriage.
a marriage annulled for impotency, there could, .of course, be no
offspring. In brief, the Code makes provision for saving the legitimacy of offspring of all voidable marriages except those annulled for
fraud or duress. This seems to be a further indication that the
introductory clause of section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law,
providing that marriages are voidable for the reasons enumerated
later in the section, and that such a voidable marriage is "void from
the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction,"
10103 App. Div. (N. Y.) 74 (19059).
"Price v. Price, 124 N. Y. 589 (18qi).
USupra, note 5.

'N. Y. Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 1745.

"N. Y. Code of Civ. Proc. see.

1749.
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is not intended as a blanket clause saving legitimacy in all cases
enumerated therein.
It is necessary here to point out a further apparent error in Houle v.
Houle. The court says, "By section 1745 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is expressly provided that the children of the void marriage
2
there considered"
shall, under the conditions therein presented, be
deemed legitimate. This provision, without doubt, was made to
overcome the common law rule which declared children of a void
marriage illegitimate. The Code, however, contains no provisionupon
the subject of legitimating children born or begotten under a voidable
marriage.5 This would seem to be entirely logical, for the all-sufficient reason that the statute has modified the common law rule under
which a voidable marriage, when annulled, became void ab initio, by
providing that it is only void from the time that its nullity is judicially
declared."' 6 But in opposition to this statement it is to be noted that
section 1745 of the Code treats of a voidable marriage and not of a
void marriage, and that the Code does make provision for legitimating
the children of all voidable marriages except those annulled for fraud
or duress, as is pointed out above.
Houle v. Houle cites in support of its conclusion McCullen v.
McCullen'7 and the Matter of Biersack. 8 In the Matter of Biersack
the voidable marriage in question had not been annulled so the effect
of the annulment decree was not involved. In McCullen v. McCullen
action was brought by A to have his marriage with B annulled on the
ground that B was married to C at the time she married A. B after
marrying A obtained a decree annulling her marriage to C on the
ground of fraud. The question was whether B could show the annulment of her marriage with C to defeat A's action for annulment.
The court based its decision that she could not, on the broad ground
that a decree of annulment of a voidable marriage is not retroactive,
but it is submitted that the decision should have been put on the
ground that annulment of a voidable contract will not operate
retroactively so as to affect the accrued rights of a third party-in this
case the accrued right of A to have his voidable marriage with B
annulled."
A somewhat similar case is that of Barker v. Barker.20 In that case
it was held that when a party under age of consent married A and
later without annulment married B, the marriage to B was absolutely
void under section 6 of the Domestic Relations Law and that annulment, under section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law, of the first
marriage did not affect the operation of section 6.
After this review of the authorities what can we say as to the proper
interpretation to be put upon the clause providing that a marriage
voidable under section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law shall be
"void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent
"Italics
are the writer's.
1
"Houle
v. Houle, ioo Misc. (N. Y.) 28, 3o, (1917).
17
McCullen v. McCullen, I62 App. Div. (N. Y.) 599 (1914).
1896 Misc. (N. Y.) i6i (x916).
191 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 117, 119.

20172 App. Div. (N. Y.)
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jurisdiction?" 2' We have Price v. Price and Jones v.Brinsmade,2
in both of which the Court of Appeals has held that this clause means
that the decree acts retrospectively. McCullen. v. McCullen and
Barker v. Barker are clearly distinguishable, leaving Gore v. Goreu
alone to support Houle v. Houle. But Gore v.Gore has been expressly
disapproved by the Court of Appeals in Jones v. Brinstnade2 and the
decision in Houle v. Houle appears to be based largely upon a code
section which the court has apparently misread. We are therefore
forced to the conclusion that a decree annulling a marriage, voidable
for any of the reasons set forth in section 7 of the Domestic Relations
Law, acts retrospectively. The wife is deprived of the right of dower
and the children are bastardized unless their legitimacy is expressly
saved by the statute.
It is certainly unjust that. when a marriage is annulled for fraud or
duress the children of such marriage should become illegitimate.
This, however, appears to be the law in New York at present, probably
through an oversight on the part of the legislators. The only remedy
for this situation lies in legislative action.
Harry H. Hoffnagle, '17.
Domestic Relations: Marriage: Validity of common-law marriage in New York.-Since January z, 19o8, there has been doubt
whether a common-law marriage was valid in New York, but the
Court of Appeals recently, in Matter of Ziegler v.Cassidy's Sons, 220
N. Y. 98 (19Z7), cleared away all the doubt. The case squarely
presented the question of the validity of a common-law marriage in
New York. A claimant for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Law alleged that she and the man who had been killed
had entered into a common-law marriage in i909 and that she was
entitled to compensation as his widow. The defense was that the
marriage was invalid, but the commissioners reached an opposite
conclusion and held the narriage valid. Upon appeal the Court of
Appeals affirmed the award of the commission.
It is undisputed that prior to January 1, 1902, a common-law
marriage, that is, a contract of marriage made per verba de praesenti,
or evidenced by cohabitation and various other acts, and not effectuated by any formal solemnization, was valid in New York,
The laws of 1901, ch. 339, section ii, however, provided that "A
marriage must be solemnized by either" certain persons there enumerated, including clergymen, municipal officials, and various judicial
officers, or by a written contract signed and acknowledged by the
2ISupra, note 5.
nSupra,note ii.
Supra, note 8.
2
Supra, note io.
.Supra, note 8.
'Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52 (1809); Van Buskirk v. Claw, I8 Johns.
(N. Y.) 347 (1820); Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 974 (1841); Clayton v.
Wardell, 4 N. Y. 23o (I85o ); O'Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y. 296 (868); Betsinger
v. Chapman, 88 N. Y. 487 (1882); Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 2O9 (1889). The
manifest recognition of common-law marriages by the early common law in New
York was given statutory sanction by the laws of 1896, ch. 272, section Io, which
provided: "This article does not require any marriage to be solemnized in the
manner herein specified, and alawful marriage contracted in the manner heretofore
in use in this State . . . . is as valid as if this article had not been enacted."
t
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parties and witnessed in the manner required for the acknowledgment
of a conveyance of real property, to entitle the same to be recorded.
S ction xg of the same act also provided, "That no marriage claimed
to have been contracted on or after January i,I 9 O2, within this State,
otherwise than in this article provided, shall be valid for any purpose
whatever." Thus the act of igoi expressly prohibited common-law
marriages.
The act of i9oi was amended in part and repealed in part by the
laws of 1907, ch 742. Section xi of the act of go1 was amended by
the act of 1907 to read, after the first word "recorded," "provided,
however, that all such contracts of marriage must, in order to be
valid, be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record." The act
of 1907 repealed all other provisions of the act of 9oi0, including
section 19, which was the express prohibitory clause, and made certain
provisions with reference to marriage licenses. Section x8 of the act
of 1907 provided that copies of the records of marriage and all other
records pertaining thereto, duly certified by the clerk of the county
where the same are recorded under his official seal shall be evidence
in all courts of record. The act of 1907 was made effective January i,
19o8.
The result of the statutory change was to cast doubt on the validity
of common-law marriages contracted after January i, x9o8. In
McCullen v.McCullen2 the Appellate Division, First Department,
stated that "Since by statute it is now required that a marriage shall
be formally solemnized or the contract shall be in writing (Dom. Rel.
Law, Section ix,)" no marriage could be inferred from the cohabitation of the parties, apparently on the theory that although the
express provision prohibiting common-law marriages had been
repealed by the laws of 1907, yet section ix of the act of r9oIy was
still in force and its provisions, that "A marriage must be solemnized"
in the manner there set forth, were mandatory and by necessary
implication prohibited any other form of marriage contract, including
common-law marriages. On the other hand it was held by some of
the lower courts that by the repeal of the express, prohibitory provision of the act of 19o, common-law marriages were again recognized
as valid, and that the provisions of section
zx of the act of igo were
4
merely directory and not mandatory.
The latter view was adopted by the Court of Appeals in the
principal case. Hiscock, Ch. J., writing for the Court, said that
section i i was to be regarded as merely directory, or as prescribing
the requirements of a formal solemnization of a marriage such. as
might be necessary to secure the benefits of registry, etc., and was not
to be regarded as invalidating a form of marriage otherwise valid, in
the absence of some provision expressly declaring or necessarily
implying that result. The Court further said that if this section was
in fact mandatory and exclusive and did in fact prohibit common-law
marriages, then the enactment of section i9of the act of igo was an
Y.) 599 (1914).
2Now
section
ix
,
Dor.
R(.I. Law.
4
Matter of Hinman, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 452 (191!); Matter of Smith, 74
Misc. (N. Y.) Ii (19ii). See also for a discussion in support of this view, i
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 48 (1915).
2162 App. Div. (N.
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entirely futile step on the part of the Legislature; but of such idle
action the Legislature should not be suspected, unless one were compelled to do so, and that to interpret section ii as merely directory
would give to the Legislature credit for an accurate comprehension of
the general rule that such a statute merely provided forms of observance which would be necessary in case of a ceremonial or formal
marriage contract, and that it did not invalidate other forms of
marriage contract; that in order to do that, it was necessary to adopt
an express prohibition of such other forms of marriage contrict and,
therefore, section i9 was adopted, complying with the rule. It
necessarily follows that if section i9 was. the only part of the act of
xgoi that prohibited a common-law marriage, then upon the repeal of
section ig, a common-law marriage again became valid.
As the Court in the principal case remarked, the Legislature, in
deciding whether or not a common-law marriage shall be valid, has
important questions of policy to consider and potent arguments pro
and con to weigh. On the one hand it may be argued that if such
marriages are allowed, they are apt to become the basis of fraud,
especially after the death of one of the parties. On the other hand, if
such marriages are prohibited, innocent children must suffer the disgrace and disabilities of bastardy and the ignominy of an unlawful
union will be inflicted upon unsuspicious women who have believed
themselves lawfully married.
Since it is the policy of the law to presume morality, marriage and
legitimacy and not immorality, concubinage'and bastardy, and since
marriage has always been a common right and therefore statutes in
derogation of that right mustbe strictly construed and willbe regarded
as merely directory, in the absence of express provisions to the
contrary,5 it is submitted that the Court of Appeals, in deciding that
a common-law marriage is again valid in New York, came to the
conclusion that best serves public policy and best accords with the
probable intent of the Legislature.
In brief summary, therefore, it will be observed that common-law
marriages contracted in New York before January I, 1902 are valid;
that section igof the act of 1goi made invalid common-law marriages
contracted between January z, 1902 and January i,i9o8, when the
act of 19o7, repealing section i9 became effective; and that, by the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the principal case, common-law
marriages contracted after January i,i9o8 are valid.
Fred S. Reese, Jr., 'i8_
Evidence: Applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the
liability of a sleeping-car company for loss of baggage.-Goldstein
v. Pullman Co., rx6 N. E. (N. Y.) 376 (r9.6) contains a very interesting discussion of the liability of a sleeping-car company for the
baggage of a passenger, stolen while said passenger was sleeping. It
appears that the plaintiff placed his diamond scarf-pin, glasses and tie
in his satchel, put the satchel in the aisle next the berth, retired at
eleven o'clock and when he arose in the morning, the satchel had
disappeared. The Court held that, while mere- proof of loss by a
"Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76 (1877).
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passenger while occupying a berth in a Pullman does not make a
primafacie case, a sleeping-car company is a quasi-bailee for hire, and
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is not the injury but the circumstances of the injury that justify the inference of negligence,
shifting the burden of explanation to the company, although the
plaintiff's duty to show negligence still remains.
Under circumstances such as these, the company is under a duty to
employ persons to maintain a strict and careful watch during the
night,' and the failure so to do constitutes negligence which is the basis
of the company's liability in case of loss, 2 the liability not being that
of the common carrier or of the innkeeper.'
At first blush, Goldstein v. Pullman Co. appears to overrule Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co.,4 in which it was held that mere proof
of loss did not even make a primafacie case. The Court, however, in
discussing the Carpenter case distinguishes it from the principal case,
saying that it is not loss alone which makes the primafacie case, but
loss coupled with the attendant circumstances. That is, when the
property is placed in a satchel, the satchel is placed in the aisle beside
the berth and the passenger is asleep, a loss would not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence. Therefore, "the thing itself
speaks," and the company must explain the loss.
In accord with the Goldstein case there is a recent District of Columbia case5 in which it was said, "The presumption thus created is a
legal one, arising from the evidence which impels its application.
When such a presumption arises, an obligation is imposed upon the
defendant of overcoming it by competent evidence."
There is, however, another line of cases in which, on a similar state
of facts, an opposite conclusion is reached. Such, for instance, is the
case where a passenger left his overcoat hanging over the berth when
he went with the rest of the passengers from the sleeping-car to dine.
The doors of the car were locked, the windows closed and yet the coat
disappeared between the time of his departure and return. The
Court held these circumstances, together with proof of loss, insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the company.6 And in
MlfcMurray v. Pullman Co.,7 where the passenger's pocketbook was
stolen from under his pillow while he was asleep, it was held that this
was not sufficient evidence to cast the burden on the defendant
company.
In some jurisdictions the character of the baggage appears to have
had the effect of limiting the company's liability for the loss thereof, as,
where the company was not held to answer for the theft by its porter
of jewelry carried merely for purposes of transportation and not for
use on the train.8 On the other hand in Pullman Co. v. Vanderhoeven'
'Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 124 N. Y. 53 (1891); Morrow v.
Pullman Co., 98 Mo. App. 351 (1903).
2Williams v. Webb, 27 Misc. (N. Y.) 508 (i899).
'Pulman
Co. v. Adams, 12o Ala. 581 (1898).
4
Supra, note i.
bRobinson v. Southern Ry. Co., 4o App. D. C. 49 (1913).
Dings v. Pullman Co., 171 Mo. App. 643 (1913).
786 111. App. 619 (9oo).
$Bacoa v. Pullman Co., 159 Fed. t (19o8).
948 Tex. App. 414.(908).
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the term "baggage" was determined to comprehend a diamond ring
carried by a female passenger on her trip, so long as it was necessary
for her use, pleasure or enjoyment in traveling, as the law had not
placed a limit upon the amount of jewelry which one might carry. In
the principal case no point was made of the fact that a diamond scarfpin was among the articles stolen, but this might have been deemed so
necessary an article of utility as not to need mention in this regard.
The Illinois case above is difficult to distinguish on its facts from
the Goldstein case. The latter represents the more liberal application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and one which commends itself to
the legal profession.

Olive J. Schmidt, 'V8.
Evidence: Competency of bloodhound evidence in criminal
trials.-In the recent case of Ruse v. State, 1z5 N.E. Rd. 778 (1917),
Indiana aligned itself with Illinois' and Nebraska2 in holding that the
actions of bloodhounds in tracing a person accused of crime were not
competent evidence against the accused. Of the sixteen jurisdictions
that have had occasion to consider this question thirteen have held
the evidence competent. = 4 The first reported case on the subject
seems to be Hodge v. State.
All of the jurisdictions admitting this character of evidence require
some preliminary showing that the dogs in question have been trained,
tested, and have had experience in trailing human beings 1 It must
also appear that they were laid on a trail, whether visible or not,
concerning which testimony has been admitted, at a point where the
circumstances tend clearly to show that the guilty party had been,
or upon a track which such circumstances indicate to have been made
by him." While it may be shown
that the dogs are of pure blood this
7
does not seem to be required.
In the jurisdictions receiving the evidence it is admitted that all
dogs are not equally unerring, and that each may fail at times in being
truthful.8 It is also admitted that the ability to follow a given human
scent is one acquired by training, and that the accuracy of the dog
depends largely upon the skill used in training it. 9 Personal attendants and surrounding conditions, such as time and weather conditions,
'People
v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411 (1914).
2
Brott
v.
State, 7o Neb. 395 (19o3).
3
McDonald v. State, x65 Ala. 85 (xgio); Padgett v. State, 125 Ark. 471 (1916);
Davis v. State, 46 Fla. 137 (1903); Harris v. State, I7 Ga. App. 723 (x916);
State v. Adams, 85 Kan. 435 (19x); Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41
(1898); Carterv. State, Io6 Miss. 507 (1913); Statev. Rasco, 239Mo. 535 (1912);
State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34 (1907); State v. Wiggins, 171 N. Car. 813
(x916); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 272 (1913); State v.
Brown, 103 S. Car. 437 (1915); Parker v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 461 (I9o4).

'98 Ala. io (z893).
'Supra, note 3.
Pedigo v .Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41, 50 (1898); State v. Dickerson, supra,
note 3; Parker v. State, supra, note 3; Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 52 Pa.
Super. Ct. 272, 277 (1913).
Spears v. State,

Ky. 508 (1905).

92

Miss. 613, 619 (19o8); Denham v. Commonwealth,

1i9

$Pedigo v. Commonwealth, supra, note 3; Commonwealth v. Hoffman, supra,

note 3.

9Supra, note 7.
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may modify the certainty of such evidence. 10 It is held, however,
that these are considerations going to the weight rather than to the
admissibility of the evidence." In most of the cases where the evidence was admitted there were strong corroborating circumstances
pbinting to the accused as the guilty party. None has been found
where a conviction was upheld in the absence of corroborating evidence, and in one case it was held a conviction could not be upheld
unless so supported. 2 In several'of the decisions the evidence was
admitted "for what it was worth," leaving the inference that its
worth was not great.
It is generally conceded that juries are likely to attach an importance to this character of evidence out of proportion to its true value;
that the mysterious power of the dogs frequently begets in the minds
of some people a superstitious awe, and that they see in such an
exhibition a direct interposition of divine providence in aid of human
justice.'4 In the majority jurisdictions, however, these dangers are
thought to be sufficiently guarded against by the preliminary proof
required, although such evidence has elements of uncertainty. The
minority view is that the value of the evidence is so slight as compared
with its dangers that it should not be received in any criminal case.
Mr. Wigmore, supporting the minority view, cites with approval the
analysis of the detective in "The Singing Bone," by Freeman." The
detective is made to say that the tracking of a known slave is not
analogous to discovering the identity of an unknown individual. In
the one case the problem is location, while in the other it is identity.
The location is proved when the bloodhound finds the slave, but when
the bloodhound finds an individual not previously known, identification of this individual as the criminal still remains uncertain, dependent upon an odorous relation between a track and a man, the
evidential value or bearing of which cannot be estimated."
Professor 0. L. McCaskill.
Interstate Commerce: Interpretation of White Slave Traffic Act.
-A considerable number of cases have recently dealt with the proper
interpretation to be placed upon the White Slave Traffic Act',
commonly known as the Mann Act, which provides in substance that
any person, who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported
in interstate or foreign commerce, any woman or girl, for the purpose
of prostitution or debauchery and for any other immoral purpose, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony. In the well known case of Caminetti v.
United States2 this statute was strictly construed. Here the defendant
had transported a woman from Sacramento, California, to Reno,
1"Supra, note 7.
"State
v. Rasco, supra, note 3; and cases there cited.
12Carter v. State, supra,note 3.
"Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 41, 50 (1898); Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
supra, note 3.
1"Supra, note 12; and State v. Moore, 129 N. Car. 494, 5oo (xgor); Carter V.
State, io6 Miss. 507, 512 (1913).

"Wigmore, Evidence, see. 177; 9 111. L. Rcv. 192.
"gSupra, note 14.
'Comp. Stats. 1913, sees. 88T2-8819.
2242 U. S. 470 (1917).
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Nevada, for the purpose of debauchery, and for the immoral purpose
of keeping her as his mistress and concubine. The majority of the
court thought that this was a violation of the statute, holding that
pecuniary gain, either as a motive for the transportation or as an
attendant of its object, is not an element in the offense covered by the
act. Three members of the court, including the Chief Justice,
dissented, expressing the opinion that the statute was not designed to
include cases of private sexual intercourse, which involved no element
of profit, even though such intercourse occasionally extended beyond
state lines.
Another interesting case, of more recent date, is that of Van Pelt i.
United States,3 especially in view of the broad doctrine laid down in
the Caminetti case. Van Pelt, it seems, had procured the interstate
transportation of a pregnant girl, with whom he had had intercourse
whenever he sought it, for the purpose of procuring a place where she
could remain until after her confinement. . He accompanied her on
the journey, and as a matter of fact, anticipated and did have sexual
intercourse with her after they had left the state. However, the
court held that there was no evidence that such anticipation played
any part in inducing him to arrange for her leaving the state, and
that "before the defendant could properly be convicted, there must
be evidence that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the defendant
* * * * was that he might have sexual intercourse with her."
It is submitted that the Van Pelt case was undoubtedly correctly
decided. It could hardly be argued that Van Pelt went to the expense
of transporting the girl for the purpose of sexual intercourse, when he
could have just as well, and in fact had many times before, gratified
his desire within the state. The Caminetticase, on the other hand, has
caused considerable discussion, but it would seem, in view of the broad
language of the statute, that this case also correctly construed the law.
Much has been said in respect to the "blackmailing construction of
the act"4 but as a practical matter, the respectable, law-abiding citizen
need have little fear of blackmail. Even so, it would seem that, in
the language of the court, "such considerations are more appropriately
addressed to the legislative branch of the government, which alone
had the authority to enact and may, if it sees fit, amend the law."
W. J. Gilleran, 'r8.
Malicious Prosecution: Civil liability of a public prosecutor for
malicious prosecution.-In Smith v. Parman, 165 Pac. (Kan.) 663
(gr7), it appeared that the defendant, a city attorney, maliciously
prosecuted the plaintiff for the violation of a city ordinance; and the
plaintiff, being acquitted, sougfit damages from the attorney. None
were allowed, and it was decided that a public prosecutor acting
officially could not be held in a civil action on account of having
instituted or maintained a prosecution for an alleged violation of the
criminal law.
Why should a prosecuting attorney enjoy such immunity? His
duty which the state has appointed him to perform is the prosecution,
a40 Fed. 346 (igr7).
42o
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in the interest of the state or city, of offenders against the criminal
law. Can he be said to be a judicial officer when so acting? It would
seem not. His function is scarcely more judicial than that of a
private attorney. Just as the latter acts whole-heartedly and solely
for his client, so does the prosecutor, as everybody recognizes, act
for the state alone. He prosecutes. The impartiality, the fairmindedness, the balancing of pros and cons, which are expected of a
judge -or grand jury, are surely not present. They exercise true
judicial discretion, and doing this must not have their motives questioned; otherwise the administration of justice would be hampered.
But it would seem that the prosecutor's determination to prosecute
cannot be considered in this light any more than a private lawyer's
determination to sue. A lawyer in arrving at this result obviously
does not perform a judicial act Further, no one questions the doctrine that holds the lawyer liable in damages who brings an action or
proceeding against another for his client, when he is actuated by
malicious motives and acts without probable cause.' By analogy
and upon principle it would follow that a public prosecutor who
prosecutes maliciously and without probable cause should be civilly
liable.
The case mainly relied upon in the instant case may well be said
to be exactly in point, 2 but it would seem that the two authorities
relied upon by that case in turn do not support it. 3 There is another
case Farrarv. Steee,4 which was not mentioned in the principal case
but which has been cited as authority for the unqualified proposition
that a prosecuting attorney, being a judicial officer of the state, is not
liable in damages for acts done in the course of his duty, although
malicious. In a contest for the possession of an office, which happened to be that of district attorney, the acting attorney under the
Intrusion Act of Louisiana in an action to determine to whom the
office belonged, refused to join the complainant as prosecuting witness
but offered to join him as defendant. It was held that no action for
'Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okl. 171 (1913) ; Warfield v. Campbell, 35 Ala. 349
(1859); Burnap v. Marsh, i3 Ill. 535 (852); Staley v. Turner, 21 Mo. App.
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2 (1886).

Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. r17 (1896).
In State v. Henning, 33 Ind. 189 (x870), an attorney havLing compounded a
crime, the question arose as to whether he was an officer entrusted with the
administration of justice. What was said was mere dictum as it was ruled that
the lower court had no jurisdiction, andthe case was decided on that ground. In
Parker v. Huntington, 2 Gray (Mass.) 12. (1854), which was an action against a
district attorney for maliciously contriving to have the plaintiff indicted for
perjury, knowing he had not committed it, the question was not decided either.
The defendant's special demurrerwas overruled on a ground of pleading and the
court was only "inclined" to its opinion against the maintenance of the case
against the attorney. To all appearances even this inclination, however, had no
foundation, for the two cases cited in support of it did not embrace the necessary
facts. In one, Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 217 (1849), the action was
brought for the issue of two indictments, one of which was wrongfully procured by
3

three persons, and as regards the other, the court said

*

*

*

* the district

attorney had rightfully procured the second to be found in consequence of the
original act of the defendants, so that the elements of malice and want of probable
cause on the part of the attorney are lacking. The other case, Parker v. Farley,
[o Cush. (Mass.) 279 (18c2), (lid not involve the liability of a public prosecutor

at all.
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damages for this refusal was maintainable against the attorney.
Upon the facts the case is correct but obviously it is not authority
for the broad statement above as to the civil liability of a public
prosecutor, for the case was decided on the basis of a statute peculiar
to that state which classed a district attorney as a judicial officer,
who in this instance exercised a discretion. The weight of authority
is opposed to such a characterization of the prosecuting attorney, and
he is quite uniformly considered as a quasi-judicial officer. 5 As such,
he is exempt from liability only for the consequences of honest errors
of judgment, beyond which his privileges do not extend. 6 New York,
however, seems to have adopted the contrary view and allows quasijudicial officers the full immunity accorded to officers strictly judicial,7
though no New York case involving the question of a prosecuting
officer's liability for malicious prosecution has been found.
It is submitted that, on the whole, the above cases are rather
opposed to, than in accord with the conclusion in Smith v. Parman.
Also, upon examination of other decisions it will be found that their
trend is contrary to the principal case. For instance, one finds it
declared that a prosecuting attorney is not liable in damages for
wrongful prosecution unless he acted maliciously, or again, that in
the ease of other public officers, while their positions may have an
important bearing upon the question of whether they are acting
reasonably and in good faith performing the duties of the office they
hold, yet if malice and want of probable cause are clearly made out,
Many
such an officer is liable as in the case of any other person.
other cases in harmony with these expressions and opposed in spirit to
the principal case are in the reports. 10
Can any justification be found upon grounds of public policy for
such freedom from civil liability for malicious prosecution of a criminal
action as the principal case grants the district attorney? It may be
said that the interests of the community are best served by a spirited
prosecution of criminal offenders. Will not these interests be impaired
by liability for malicious prosecution? Such an argument would
have more weight in its application to private persons, who may be
intimidated and refrain from making accusations which the public
welfare demands, but when a person takes upon himself an office whose
6Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473 (1894); People v. Bemis, 51 Mich.
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(1883);

Ward v. Romero, 17 N. M. 88 (1912); Commonwealth v. Bubnis, 197 Pa. St. 542
(190I).

6KendaU v. Stokes, 3 How. (U. S.) 87, 98 (1845); Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Ia.
153 (1864); Pike v. Megoun, 44 MO. 491 (1869); Gregory v. Brooks, 37 Conn.
365 (1870); Black v. Linn, 17 S. D. 335 (19o3); Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402

(1848).
T
Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 117 (1846); Mills v. City of Brooklyn,
32 N. Y. 389 (r865) (dictum); East River Gas Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y.
557 (1883).
gArnold v. Hubble, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 947 (1897).
9Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. 244 (x9o6), (chairman of board of super-

visors); Stephens v. Conley, 48 Mont. 352 (1914), (warden of prison); Goodwin v.

Guild, 94 Tenn. 486 (1895), (mayor).
10james v. Sweet, 125 Mich. 132 (19oo); Kutner v. Fargo, 20 Misc. (N. Y.)
207 (x897), affirmed, 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 317 (i898); Pike v. Megoun, 4Mo.
491 (i869); Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239 (1869); Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. Va
486 (1873).
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very object is the prosecution of criminals, he is not only prompted
in the energetic pursuit of his duties by whatever sense of duty he
feels to the state, but also by the prime stimulus of self-interest, which
today evokes marked aggressiveness in prosecuting attorneys. He
must prosecute or die politically. Restraints have, rather, become
necessary in order to insure against a too ambitious activity. Cases
declare that a prosecuting attorney must not suggest false charges
against a prisoner, or introduce improper testimony against him, or
distort or withhold evidence in order to convict." These decisions
represent the public's expression of what it considers its best interests
-in other words, public policy. The creation of the prosecutor's
liability in damages would undeniably have a beneficial result.
Inasmuch as the adoption of a rule making a public prosecutor
civilly liable for the malicious prosecution of a criminal suit would be
in accord with sound principle, analogy and public policy, it is
believed that this rule should be adopted.
Eugene F. Gilligan, 'i9.
Principal and Agent: Agentactingforbothparties: RighttoCompensation.--It is a fundamentalrule in the law of agency that an agent
must exercise the highest degree of good faith toward his principal. If
he violates his trust, he is entitled to no compensation for any service
he may have rendered. In Erland v. Gibbons, i76 App. Div. (N. Y.)
552 (1917), an action was brought by a real estate broker for commissions claimed to have been earned for effecting an agreement for the
exchange of real estate. The plaintiff had been employed by the
defendant to sell certain houses and lots in the city of New York, or
to procure an exchange thereof for a farm. The plaintiff found a
person who owned a farm outside of New York City, and an agreement was made between the respective owners of the country and
city properties for an exchange. Defendant claimed that the
plaintiff had an agreement, concealed from defendant, whereby he was
to receive a commission likewise from the owner of the farm. The
plaintiff admitted this secret agreement, but claimed that it did not
preclude a recovery of commissions from the defendant. The
Appellate Division, however, did not agree with this contention, and
held that the broker could not recover any compensation because of
that good faith owing to his principal, which he had broken by acting
in a double capacity as agent for both parties.
In every contract of agency there is an implication of law that the
agent shall use his4best efforts to promote the interests of his principal.
This is required by his position as agent, and anything adverse to
those interests is incompatible with his duties as an agent. If, in the
same transaction, an agent or broker should act for another, such
action would usually be inconsistent with the proper discharge of his
obligations to his first employer.
Ordinarily the interests of the seller and purchaser of property are
opposed to each other. The seller attempts to get the highest price
and the buyer tries to obtain the property at the lowest. If a broker
"Smith v. People, 8 Colo. 457 (1885); People v. Montague, 71 Mich. 447
(1888); Peoplev. Vanderhoof, 71 Mich. 158 (1888).
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is employed to sell the property, and at the same time he also acts for
the proposed purchaser, this secret agency is likely to act as a fraud
upon one or the other. When an agent acts in such a capacity,
attempting to serve adverse iatekests, he ivill not be allowed to
recover any compensation for the services he renders. "This doctrine has its foundation, not so much in the commission of actual
fraud,"' as in the tendency of such a double agency to lead to the
breach of the relationship of trust and confidence.
This rule has been generally accepted, but the main difficulty arises
in its application. The test adopted by the New York courts, and
laid down in the principal case, depends upon the character of the
employment. Where the broker or agent has the least discretion, or
where the party has the right to rely on the broker for the benefit of2
his skill and judgment, then there can be no acting in both capacities.
But if the agent is merely employed for the purpose of bringing the
parties together, and has nothing to do with fixing the price or the3
terms of the sale, then it is possible for him to act for both principals.
In this latter case, the .New York courts reason that under such
circumstances there is no conflict of interests, and that the agent has
not violated his trtst. A similar test has also been adopted in a
number of other jurisdictions. 4 But it has been repudiated in a few
jurisdictions, notably in New Jersey5 and Nebraska.' The general
rule is applied with strictness in New Jersey. "The reason of the rule
is apparent; owing to the selfishness and greed of our nature, there
must, in the great mass of the transactions of mankind, be a strong
and almost ineradicable antagonism between the interests of the seller
and buyer, and universal experience has shown that the average man
will not, where his interests are brought in conflict with those of his
employer, look upon his employer's interests as more important and
entitled to more protection than his own. * * * * The rights of
'People v. Township, ii Mich. 222 (1863).
Bollman v. Loomis, 41 Conn. 581 (874); Fish v. Leser, 69 Ill.
394 (1873);
Black v. Miller, 71 Ill. App. 342 (1897); Farnsworth v. Hemmer, x Allen (Mass.)
494 (186i); Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348 (1867); Smith v. Townsend, io9
Mass. 500 (1872); Ricev. Wood, 113 Mass. 133 (1873); Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md.
I58 (1874); Mercantile Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hope Ins. Co., 8 Mo. App. 408 (188o);
Winter v. Carey, 127 Mo-App. 6oi (1907); Clinkscales v. Clark, 137 Mo. App.
"I2(1909); Jansen v. Wiliams, 36 Neb. 869 (1893); Young v. Hughes, 32 N. J.
Eq. 372 (1880); Porterv. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174 (882); Duryee v. Lester,
75 N. Y. 44 (1878); Claflinv.Farmer'sandCitizen'sBank, 25 N.Y. 293 (1862);
Central Ins. Co. v. Nat'l. Protection Ins. Co., 14 N.Y. 85 (856); Neuendorff v.
The World Mutual Life Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 389 (187.7); Jacobs v. Beyer, 141 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 49 (19o); Carnan v. Beach, 63 N. Y. 97 (1875); Murray v. Beard,
02 N. Y. 505 (1886); Pratt v. Dwelling House Mutual Fire Ins. Co., i3o N. Y.
206 (1891); Bank of New York Nat'l. Banking Association v. American Dock
and Trust Co., 143 N. Y. 559 (x894); Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 256 (1872);
Lynch v. Fallon. ii R. I. 311 (1876); Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. I (1896);
Meyer v. Hanchett, 43 Wis. 246 (,877); Parker v. McKenna, io L. R. Ch. App.
Cases, 96 (1874); People v. Township, supra,.note x. Also see 2 Corpus Juris
712, with collection of cases.
2
Knauss v. Brewing Co., 142 N. Y. 70 (x894).
'Green v. Robertson, 64 Cal. 75 (1883); Montross v. Eddy, 94 Mich. 1oo
(1892); Ranney v. Donovan, 78 Mich. 318 (1889); Webb v. Paxton, 36 Minn.
532 (1887).
5
Porter v. Woodruff, supra, note 2.
GJansen v. Williams, supra, note 2.
2
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the principal will not be changed, nor the capacity of the agent
enlarged, by the fact that the agent is not invested with a discretion,
but simply acts under an authority to purchase a particular article at
a specified price, or to sell a particular article at the market price.
* * * * The general interests of justice and the safety of those
who are compelled to repose confidence in others alike demand that
the courts shall always inflexibly mainta n that great and salutary
rule. * * * * No such distinction [whether in a case of discretion
or notf] is recognized by the adjudications, nor can it be established
without removing an important safeguard against fraud." s The
Massachusetts courts have also been strict in a number of cases. 9
In Rice v. Wood,10 the p aintiff acted as agent for both principals in the
same transaction. The defendant principal who was sued for the
commission knew of this dual capacity, but the other principal was
ignorant of it. The agent was not allowed to recover for the reason
that it was "an agreement which placed the plaintiff under the
temptation to deal unjustly.""
Under the New York rule the application of the test of discretion
becomes difficult in some cases. When is the agent exercising discretion? Consider the case where a broker is called upon merely to
bring the parties together; for example, as agent for a seller, where
there are two or more prospective buyers, he may be called upon to
exercise a choice as to which of the prospective buyers he shall bring
to the seller. What is he to do? If he uses his own discretion in that
matter has he violated a duty of his relation with his first employer?
If he does not use discretion in the choice he may be unfavorably
affecting the best interests of his employer. It is submitted that the
New Jersey doctrine,U2 followed in scme other jurisdictions, is too
strict. According to these decisions even if the agent bad no authority to bind his principal and is only employed to bring the parties
together, nevertheless it is obligatory upon him to perform those
services in the interest of the party who first employed him and in his
interest only. Of the two doctrines, that in New York, although not
entirely satisfactory, will, in its practical application, work better
justice to all the parties concerned.
However, the same person is not prevented from acting as agent of
both parties in the same transaction when their interests do not
conflict, and where loyalty to the one is not a breach of duty to the
other. 13 In German Ins. Co. v. IndependentSchool Districtof Milford,14
a school board, by vote, had authorized its president to enter into a
contract of insurance through an insurance agent who was also a
member of the board. The contract was allowed because the interest
of the agent as a member of the school bcard was merely nominal,
and no greater than that of any other resident of the school distr ct.
7Italics are the writer's.

Potter v. Woodruff, supra,note 2.
gWalker v. Osgood, supra, note 2; Rice v. Wood, supra,note 2.
10Supra, note 2.
"Rice v. Wood. supra,note

2.

"2Porter v. Woodruff, supra, note 2.

"2Nolte v. Hulbert, 37 Oh. St. 445 (1882); German Ins. Co. v. Independent
School District of Milford, 8o Fed. 366 (1897).
USupra, note 13.
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And there is no objection if both parties to the transaction consent
to a dual capacity on the part of the agent,"5 but perfect good faith
must always be maintained and clear proof of consent on the part of
the principals must be shown." The rule does not disqualify one
who is the agent of one party from acting as agent of an adverse party
for an entirely different purpose, 7 or where the first agency has terminated.'8 The rule prohibiting a double agency is not affected by a
custom among brokers to charge commissions for double service, of
which the principal is ignorant.' 9
Where an agent undertakes to act improperly for both parties a
court of equity will rescind the contract on the application of either of
the parties.20 It is immaterial whether there was an intention on the
part of the agent to defraud,2 whether the transaction was advantageous to the complaining principal, or whether he suffered injury
from it; the act of the agent is condemned because of its tendency to
a breach of a relation of trust and confidence.2'
William E. Vogel, 'z9.
Principal and Agent: Liability of sub-agent of collecting bank to
holder of note.-In Gilpin v. Columbia National Bank, 22o N. Y. 406
(1 9 17),'it appeared that aToronto bank, acting asacollectingagentfor
theholder, senta note to the defendant bank at Buffalo for collection.
Thereaftertheholdercalledatthe latterbank, toldthe cashierheowned
thenote and wantedit duly protested and theindorser notifiedin caseit
was not paid, as he had ascertained that the maker was not financially
good. The cashier replied that he would attend to it. The defendant bank wrote the collecting bank of the holder's instructions, and
asked that bank if it would consent to all further communications
concerning the note being carried on with the holder, to which the
collecting bank replied in the affirmative. The defendant bank did
not take the proper steps for holding the indorser, and the question
arises: Can the holder recover directly from the defendant bank?
The court held that the collecting bank alone became liable to the
plaintiff on account of negligence of itself or defendant, its agent, in
presentment for payment and in protesting the note, as the conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant did not create the
relation of agency, there being no privity between them.
1Ramspeck v. Pattillo, 104 Ga. 772 (1898); Alexander v. Northwestern Chris.

tian University, 57 Ind. 466 (1877); Dull v. Royal Ins,. Co., 159 Mich. 671 (igio) Petersv. Carroll, 153 Mo. App. 375 (1910); JOSlinv. Cowee, 6 N.

Patterson v. Van Loon, 186 Pa. 367 (x898).
"Marshall v. Reed, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 6o (igo6).

. 626 (1874);

Hisley v. Arey, 27 Me. 362 (1847); Natchez Ins. Co. v. Stanton, Buckner &
Co., 10 Miss. 340 (1844).
1Short v. Millard, 68 Ill. 292 (1873).
19Burnham City Lumber Co. v. Rannie, 59 *Fla. 179 (1910); Farnsworth v.
Hemmer, supra,note 2; Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 18 (i74); Ferguson v. Gooch,

supra, note 2.
"OFish v. Leser, 69 Ill. 394 (1873); N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Protection
Inis. CO., 14 N. Y. 85 (x856).
"Black v. Miller, supra, note 2; Duryee v. Lester, supra, note 2.
22Black v. Miller, sup ra, note 2; People v. Township, supra, note i - Walker v.

Osgood, supra, note 2; Young v. Hughts, supra, note 2; Porter v. Woodruff,
supra, note 2; Everhart v. Searle, supra, note 2
'Chase, Cardozo and Pound, J. J., dissenting without opinion
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There are three views as to the liability of a collecting bank to the
holder of negotiable paper:
The New York and United States Supreme Court view is that the
collecting bank is alone liable for any negligence or default of its
agent, as well as the negligence or default of its own immediate servants, regarding the collection of2the note, whether the parties reside
at the place of its location or not.
A second class of cases requires that the bank shall exercise due care
and diligence in selecting competent and trustworthy agents, and
when it has done this, the first bank is exonerated from all liability.
The sub-agent
becomes a substitute agent, liable directly to the
3
holder.
A third class of cases holds that where a bank receives a note for
collection from a maker, resident in the same place, the collecting bank
is liable for any loss that may occur, but when the maker resides at
some distant place the4 collecting bank is liable only for the selection
of a competent agent.
In the present case, if the holder had had no conversation with the
cashier of the defendant bank, there would be no doubt, according
to the well established New York rule, that the Toronto bank alone
should have been liable to the holder for any negligence of the
defendant. The principal case holds that the fact that the holder
interfered and gave directions to the Buffalo Bank does not change the
situation, the Toronto bank still being alone liable. There seem to
be no other NewYork decisions dealingwith an identical state of facts.
It is submitted that the court, by applying merely a contractual
test in determining the liability of the defendant, took too"narrow a
view of the legal relationship which had been created. It is not
suggested that the defendant bank was liable to the holder on the
theory that a new contract was created between the parties by the
conversation, for there was no new detriment to the promisee and no
new benefit to the promisor. But conceding that there was no new
contract, still it would seem that the defendant bank should be liable
to the holder for there was a new undertaking onits part which was
improperly fulfilled to the injuryof theplaintiff.6 It isnownecessaryto
consider to what extent one, who undertakes to do something gratuitously is responsible for negligence to the mandator (as the one for
whom the act is done is called).
The leading English case,' although it is often cited to sustain the
2
Allen v. The Merchant's Bank of the City of New York, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 215
(1839); The Commercial Bank of Pa. v. The Union Bank of New York, i I N. Y.
203 (1854); The Montgomery County Bank v. The Albany City Bank, 7 N. Y
459 (1852); Ayrault v. The Pacific Bank, 47 N. Y. 570 (1872); Saint Nicholas
Bank of New York v. The State National Bank, 128 N. Y. 26 (189!); Exchange
National Bank of Pittsburg v. Third National Bank, I12 U. S. 276 (1884).
3Carlinville National Bank v. Wilson, 78 Ill. App. 339 (1898); Bank v. Newland,
97 Ky. 464 (1895); The First National Bank of Manning v. The German Bank of
Carrol County, 107 Ia. 543 (1899).
4Irwin v. Reeves Pulley Co., 20 Ind. App. ioi (1897); First National Bank of
Corsicana v. City National Bank of Dallas, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 318 (1896); Daly v.
The Butcher's and Drovers Bank of St. Louis, 56 Mo. 94 (1874).
5See "Gratuitous Undertakings", by Professor Joseph H. Beale, Jr., 5 Harv.
L. R. 222.
6Coggs v. Barnard, 2 Ld. Raymond's Rep. (Eng). 909 (17o).
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proposition that one who does an act gratuitously is responsible for
gross negligence only, holds that if a man undertakes to do a thing
even though he is to receive no reward, and negligently-i. e., without
reasonable care,-executes such undertaking, he is liable in an action
on thc case to him for whom the act is done. . This rule seems to be
generally followed in most American states, including New York. 8
An early New York case which ig the leading case in this state and
in the United States is Thorne u. Deas.9 There one partner promised
his copartner to procure joint property to be insured, but omitted to
have the insurance effected. The property was lost, and the court
held that "a mandatary, or one who undertakes to do an act for
another without reward, is not answerable for omitting to do the act,
and isonly responsible when he attempts to do it, and does it amiss,"
a distinction being drawn between nonfeasance and misfeasance.
The same doctrine is laid down by the Supreme Court in these words:
"The rule seems to be well settled, that if a person undertakes an
employment or trust, and begins performance of it, he is liable for any
injuries which may result from his neglect, even though he may not
have received any consideration for the promise. If he omit to do
what he has thus agreed to accomplish, the failure of consideration
excuses his omission.' u0 And it has even been declared further that
when the thing which is the subject of the agreement has been actually
delivered to and accepted by the mandatary, there can be no nonfeasance, for if he fails to do the act he has undertaken, such failure
is considered misfeasance."
It is submitted that in view of these authorities the court could
have given the plaintiff relief, by reason of the new, though gratuitous
undertaking of the Buffalo bank to the holder, without infringing
upon its rule that a principal cannot have an action in contract against a sub-agent, and that in failing to do so, the court
has reached a result which, if followed, will work unnecessary hardship
to holders of notes in situations similar to that of the present holder.
Jane M. G. Fosten. 'WS.
'The action on the case antedates the modem doctrine of consideratoncontracts. See, "The History of Assumpsit" by James Barr Ames, 2 Harv.
Law.
Rev. i, 2.
8

Kaw Brick Co. v. Hogsett, et al., 73 Mo. App. 432 (1897); Criswell v. Riley,

5 Ind.App. 496 (1892); Nellisv. DeForest, 16 Barb, (N. Y.) 61 (1852); MCCullough's Lead Co. v. Strong, 35 N. Y. Super. 21 (1872);" Smedes v. Bank of Utica,
20 Johns. (N. Y.) 372 (1823); Ainsworth v. Backus, 5 Hun. (N. Y.) 414 (18751;
Thorne v. Deas post, note 9; see dictum, Rose v. U. S. Telegraph Co., 3 Abb. Pr.
n. s. (N. Y.) 408, 410 (1867).
94 Johns (N. Y.) 84 (1899).
'OAinsworth v. Backus, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 414 (1875).
"Herzig v. Herzig, 67 Misc. (N. Y.) 250 (19IO).
uThe courts of some states hold that where one undertakes to do an act gratuitously, he is liable for grossnegligenceonly. Connerv. Winton, 8 Ind. 315 (T856);
Cowley v. Davidson, ioMinn.392 (1865); Richardson v. Futrell, 42 Miss. 525
(1869). This is the minority view, and even in these states, the result would
seem to be the same as that suggested as the correct rule for the principal case for
whether the degree of negligence is sufficient to constitute "gross negligence"
depends upon whether one is or is not accustomed to do the particular act, a
greater degree of ngeligence being required in the latter case. Shiells v. Blackburne, I H- Black. (Eng.) 158 (1789).
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Real Property:
Accretion and avulsion.-In Randolph v.
Hinck, 277 IIl. ii (1r97), it was held that where a river constitutes a
boundary line between two states, the boundary line, in case of a
change in the river bed, follows the main thread of the main channel,
as long as the changes in the channel are gradual and imperceptible,
and due only to accretion and reliction; but in cases of sudden avulsion, separating a tract of land from that to which it was attached, the
boundary line remains the same, and the part attached, if capable of
identification, remains vested in its former owner.
This distinction has come down through a long line of cases, until,
usually without giving reasons, the courts agree that the owner of
land is entitled to all addition by acccretion or reliction if the change is
made gradually and imperceptibly,' and equally agree that no change
is worked in boundary line or ownership by avulsiofl.*
The earliest cases bearing on the subject were those having to do
with the seashore. In these early cases the crown was said to own all
land formed by the reliction of the sea.8 Opposed to this was the
asserted custom of frontages, which was that those whose lands lay in
front of the sea should have the derelict soil, based on the reason that
the people who were obliged to keep up defenses against the encroachments of the sea, and who would naturally be the sufferers if any
overflow occurred, should receive the gain. But this custom was
held to be invalid for the reason that the riparian owner might obtain
too large an inheritance in this way.'
In 1828 the case of Gifford v. Yarborough,' which involved the right
of an owner on the seashore as against the crown, brought to issue the
question as to whether the king or riparian owner should have the soil
added by accretion. The decision was given to the riparian owner.
Beside ascribing the right of the owner to custom, and basing his
decision very strongly on this, the court makes the distinction between
accretion and avulsion, in that the former soil is not productive or fit
for use until trodden into consistency by the riparian owner's cattle.
The land is a reward for making it productive, whereas, in the case
of avulsion, large tracts are often deposited on the land or are bared,
in such a way as to be dry and fit for the ordinary purposes for which
landisused. Therule now applies equally to reliction as to accretion.$
This reasoning was more applicable to the sea front than to the
present modem problem. Nevertheless courts have cited this case as
authority for the distinction, without apparently inquiring into the
conditions. 7
The law of accretion was also ascribed to the principle based on the
'Gould, Waters, p. 307, note x; i R. C. L. 228, note 16.
21 R. C. L. 229, note 19.
'The King v. Tririity House, x Keb. (Eng.) 301 (1662); Whittaker v. Wife and
Lady Newburgh, 2 Keb. (Eng.) 759 (671).
4Woolrych, Law of Waters, p. 3o; Sir Valentine Brown's Case and Bushey's
Case,
reported by Callis in his reading on the Statute of Sewers in 1662, par. 48.
55sBing. (Rng.) 163 (1828).
'Warren v. Chambers, 25 Ark. i2o (x867); Burke v. Niles, 2 Hannay (N. B.)
166
(1870); Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348 (1875); see citations, supra, note i.
7
Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Port. (Ala.) 9 (1838); Kraut v. Crawford, 18 Ia. 549
(l865).
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maxim, "De minimis non curat lez." 8 In Foster v. Wright,g Judge
Lindley said, ."The law on this subject is based on the impossibility of
identifying from day to day small additions to or subtractions from
land caused by the constant action of running water. The history of
the law shows this to be the case. Our own law may be traced back
through Blackstone, 0 Hale," Britton,'2 Fleta, 3 and Bracton, 14 to the
Institutes of Justinian."' 5 In Attorney General v. Chambers16 the Lord
Chancellor expressed dissatisfaction with this basis, because, although
the addition may be small and insignificant in'its progress, yet after a
lapse of time, a very large increase may have taken place which it
would not be beneath the law to notice. This has been shown in
several cases. In East Omaha Land Co. v. Jeffries" an area of riparian
property containing thirty-seven acres had a little more than doubled
in extent by accretion. In a late case,18 where one hundred and
twenty-seven acres were washed away from one side f a stream and
joined to the land on the other side in less than three years, perceived
in its progress by no one, it was held to be accretion. In the Yarborough case' 9 the total increase was four h rdred and sixty acres.
If we accept the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor and the evidence of
these cases, there would not seem to be any sufficient reason here to
allow the riparian owner to hold the land by accretion and not by
avulsion, as both deposits may be of equal size despite their different
manner of deposit.
In the case of Re Hull and S. R. Co.20 Baron Aldeson suggests that
that which cannot be perceived in its progress is taken to be as if it
had never existed. But as shown aboven this would seem to be a
somewhat extravagant assumption.
The law of frontages as a basis again appears in the cases stating
as the principle of accretion the law of compensation, giving the
riparian owner the increase because he is liable to loss by the encroachment of the water.n This also can be said to afford no basis for a
distinction between accretion and avulsion.
gLammers v. Nissen, 4 Neb. 245 (1876).
94 C. P. D. (Eng.) 438 (1878).
102 Blackstone's Com., s61, 262.
"Hale, De jure Maris, cc. 1, 6. This would not seem to be completely accurate,
inasmuch as the law in Foster v. Wright was based on the perceptibility of progress, whereas Hale based his also on the imperceptibility of result. Hargraves,
Law Tracts, 28.
122 Britton, c. 2.
'33 Fleta, c. 2, ss. 6.
'42 Bracton, C. 2.
'62 Saunders Justinian 167.
"N De. G. & J. (EnJ.) 55 (1859).

4o Fed. 386 (1889).

17

"$Nix v. Pfeifer, 73 Ark. '99 (09o4).
"9Gifford v. Yarbroough, supra, note 5.
205 Mees. & W. (Eng.) 327 (1839).
"'East Omaha Land Co. v. Jeffries, supra,note 17; Nixv. Pfeifer, supra, note z8;
Gifford v. Yarborough, supra, note 5.
M2Denn( v.Cotton, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 634 (x893); Sweringen v. St. Louis, ISI
Mo. 348 1899); Throop v. Cobourg & P. R. Co., ,5U. C. C. P. (Can.) 509 (1854);
New Orleans v. United States, io Pet. (U. S.) 662 (1836); East Omaha Land Co.
v. Jeffries, supra, note 17.
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As stated in Lamprey v State,' the rule giving the riparian owner
the right to alluvion was adopted to preserve the fundamental
riparian right which constitutes the principal value of the land-that
of access to the water. To the suggestion that this rule for the
preservation of the riparian right will be equally applicable to cases
of avulsion or sudden change of the bed of the stream, a text writer on
the subject answers24 that, "when by nature the riparian contact has
been destroyed the riparian owner can not insist upon having it
restored at the expense of third persons who have obtained rights by
the same act." He does not state what these rights are, or why they
are iights. The question would seem to be whither it is fairer for A
to lose his water rights or for B to lose his land.
This raises the further question as to which is the greater right, the
riparian water right or the right to land as long as capable of identification. The right to land, as being more tangible and absolute, should
perhaps be given greater consideration. Allowing this as a superior
right, the principle stated in Lamprey v. StateP would seem to be a
reasonable one, and the only one showing a satisfactory distinction
between accretion and avulsion under the present conditions.
L. W. Dawson, 'g.
Trade Unions:
Disgipline of members by pressure on
employers.-In Harvey vt' Chapman, 115 N. E. (llass.) 304 (z917),
the plaintiff, a grocer, sued members of an association of clerks who
had endeavored to dissuade people from buying of him by picketing
his store and advising all friends of labor to deal elsewhere. Two of
the plaintiff's clerks were members of the association who had refused
to pay their back dues, and the purpose of the boycott was to oblige
the plaintiff either to discharge these clerks or to compel them to pay
their dues. All the plaintiff's clerks were themselves perfectly
content to continue in his employment. It was held that the acts
of the defendants were illegal. In Shinsky v. Tracey, Z14 N. E.
(Mass.) 957 (1r7), the defendants were officers of a voluntary trade
union and the plaintiff was an expelled member. The defendants, by
threats of strikes of union men, prevented the plaintiff from getting
employment at his trade in the city in which he resided. Their
purpose was to enforce discipline in their own ranks. It was held
that the defendants were liable in damages on the ground that their
actions impaired the plaintiff's right to acquire property by labor.
There is a balancing of interest involved in determiningwhether itis
consistent with public policy for a union to bring pressure to bear on
employers to enforce discipline within its own ranks. On the onehand
thereis theinterest which the individual workingmen havein acquiring
property by their labor, and that which the employer ha§ in conducting his business in the most profitable manner. On the other
hand there is the interest which the union has in making itself strong
enough to enforce demands for better cohditions for its members. In
the two cases under discussion, this interest manifests itself in an
effort to enforce union discipline.
2352 Minn. i8, (1893).
241 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights, 327.
26

6Supra, note 23.
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The general rule in most jurisdictions is that to cause, intentionally,
the cessation or non-formation of profitable economic relations is
unlawful if damage follows, though no tortious means are used.'
Even though no breach of contract is involved, the plaintiff makes
out a prim fa e case and wins, unless the defendant can show a
justification.2 The defendant can often give a justification by showing that his economic interest is involved. Thus a strike is held to be
lawful in most jurisdictions if its direct object is to secure better
conditions of employment, provided, of course, that lawful means are
used to carry it out.3 But even though the defendant's economic
interest is involved, interference with profitable economic relations is
held unlawful if the means used are considered by the court to be
contrary to public policy. A conspicuous example of this is the
secondary labor boycott, which is held unlawful in many jurisdictions.4 The pressure brought to bear on third persons is there considered unlawful. There is a conflict of authority as to whether the
benefit which a union may derive in a strike for a closed shop is a
sufficient justification for such a strike.,
There are some grounds for not supporting the doctrine of Shinsky
v. Tracey. The maintenance of union discipline might be considered
sufficient justification for the interference with the economic advancement of the expelled member, for it usually results in benefit to the
numerous members of the union, and in harm only to the laborer
with whom the union has a quarrel. Ordinarily the employer is not
harmed, for he can get another man to replace the one whose discharge is sought by the union. It is only where a certain laborer is
particularly valuable to an employer that the employer is harmed by
his discharge. Furthermore, the laborer, by becoming a member of
the union, must be deemed to have consented to the exercise of its
discipline in furtherance of its lawful purposes. But if the plaintiff's
expulsion from the union is not fair-that is, not in accordance with
union rules, he cannot be deemed to have consented, and the acts of
the union will be held illegal.8
1Thus the intentional procurement of a breach of contract is a tort, Lumley v.
Gye, 2 El. &Bl. (Eng.) 216 (18.3); Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 333 (I88I);
National Phonograph Co. v. Edison Co., L. R. (Igo8) . Ch. 335.
'Berry v. Donovan, x88 Mass. 353, 356 (905); Read v. Friendly Society of
Operative Stonemasons (1902) 2 K. B. 88, 96.
'Minasian v. Osborne, 2io Mass. 2.50 (19Ii).

4Beattie v. Callanan, 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 7 (1903); Auburn Draying Co. v.
Wardell, 178App. Div. (N.Y.) 270 (1917); Purvisv. Local No. 5oo, U. B.of C.&J.,
214 Pa. 348 (Igo6); Shinev. Fox Bro. Mfg. Co., z56 Fed. 357 (1907). The following cases, however, hold that a secondary labor boycott is lawful, Meier v. Speer,
g6 Ark. 618 (I9iO); Searle Mfg. Co. v. Terry, 56 Misc. (N. Y.) 265 (1905).
Bossert v. Dhuy, New York Court of Appeals, 1917, decided after this note was
written; see following note, "Trade Unions, Secondary Boycott."

'The following cases hold that a strike for a closed shop is lawful, Kemp v.
Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213 (92); Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn.
171 (1903); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, I5o Fed. i55 (I9o6);
contra, Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (i9oo). To the effect that a strike for a
closed shop is unlawful, see Berry v. Don van, supra,note 2, though this case
involved no strike, but merely a demand by the union that non-union employees

be

discharged.

'in Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, Local No. 17, 73 N. J. L. 729
(x9o6), and in Connell v. Stalker, 20 Misc. (N. Y.) 423 (1897), aff'd 21 Misc.
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The case of Harvey v. Chapmanis somewhat complicated by the fact
that the employees (all of whom belonged to the association) seemed
perfectly content to remain in their employment, notwithstanding the
action taken by the members not in the same employment. This
gives the court a ground for holding the defendants liable which is not
present in the other case, namely, that the union's action had not the
support of any of the persons directly concerned.
The reasons in support of the doctrine of the Massachusetts cases
seem stronger than those against it. In Shinsky v. Tracey the court
mentions the extreme hardship which the union works upon the
expelled member in making it practically impossible for him to obtain
work in the community in which he resides. In Harvey v. Chapman
ax effort to enforce the payment of dues is not regarded as a legal
justification for a boycott against the employer of the members
indebted to the union, and it is pointed out that the quarrel is not
primarily between the union and the employer, but between the
union and his employees.
The very few authorities on the precise point involved in these two
cases are in accord with therL7 A statement in an English case
attempts to give an additional reason for the illegality of such conduct
on the part of the labor union in that the law provided an ample
remedy against the members of the union who were indebted to it. 8
The answer to this is that the disciplinary effect of preventing someone
from getting work is greater than that of bringing an action at law
against him, even assuming that an action lies.
The New York courts are more liberal towards labor unions than
are the courts of most other jurisdictions. In New York the causing
of the cessation or the non-formation of profitable relations is not in
itself unlawful. For example, it is not necessary in New York to show
a justification for a primary boycott. 9 The courts of this state favor
the union in strikes for a closed shop, the primary object of which is
tN. Y.) 6o9 (1897), a laborer excluded from a union in violation of the rules of the.
union and prevented from getting work was allowed damages. For a discussion
of Connell v. Stalker, and its relation to the New York law on interference with
business by lawful means, see an article on "Interference with Contracts and
Business in New York", by E. W. Huffcut, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 423,433. In Blanchard v. Newark Joint District Council, 77 N.J L. 389 (i909), a fine was "illegally"
imposed upon the plaintiff by the unon
he plaintiff refused to pay it and w~as
prevented from getting work. For this he sued for damages, which were allowed.
7In Giblan v. National Amalgamated Laborers' Union of Great Britain and
Ireland, L. R. (19,03) 2 KC B. 6oo, a workman in trouble with the union sued it
for preventing him from getting work and was allowed damages. See also Conway v. Wade, L. R. (i9o9) A. C. 5o6. In this case the plaintiff had been subjected
to a fine by the union. Upon his refusal to pay it, the union induced his employer
to discharge him, by threats that otherwise the union men would cease work. The
defense was that theRc acts were not illegal tinder the Trades Disputes Act of 1906.
But it was held that the defendant was liable in damages to the plaintiff.
sGiblan v. National Amalgamated Laborers' Union of Great Britain and Ireland,
supra, note 7.
9In Foster v. The Retail Clerks' International Protective Association, 39 Misc.
(N. Y.) 48 (1902), it was held that the peaceful picketing by sympathizers with a
labor union of the store of the employer with whom the union had a quarrel, in
order to prevent union men from dealing with the employer, was lawful. See also
Cohen v. The United Garment Workerp of America, 35 Misc. (N. Y.) 748 (1901).
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not to get the non-union men discharged, but to benefit the strikers. 10
There is slight difference in principle between the case of a strike to
enforce the non-employment of men who have never been in the
union, and a strike to prevent the employment of one who is in trouble
with the union. Therefore, while there is no way of ascertaining
positively what the New York law would be on the point, one may
infer that it would be lawful for a union to bring pressure upon an
employer of union men, as was done in Shinsky v. Tracey, in order
to enforce union rules against members or ex-members. The union's
interest in such a case as Harvey v. Chapman might be thought too
indirect.
C. V. Parsell,Jr., '19.
Trade Unions: Secondary boycott to prevent use of material made
in open shop.-On Oct. 9, 1917, the New York Court of Appeals, in
Bossert v. Dhuy,' by an unanimous court, reversing z66 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 25z, held to be legal the action of the defendants, the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, in announcing to the builders
and contractors of the city of New York that on all jobs where members of the Brotherhood were employed, only material made by union
labor should be used. . In case such material was not used it was
stated that the members of the Brotherhood would refuse to work.
The plaintiffs operate an open shop and manufacture doors, sash,
blinds, and various other kinds of woodwork. In this action they
asked for an injunction restraining the defendants from threatening
or causing labor troubles to follow the use by contractors and builders
of the supplies made by the non-union labor employed by the plaintiff.
This injunction the Court of Appeals refused to sustain.
It was a rule of the defendant Brotherhood that any member who
worked with non-union men or upon materials made by non-union
labor made himself liable to fine or expulsion from the Brotherhood.
The Appellate Division found as a matter of fact that the defendants
believed that it would be to their advantage not to handle the mill
products of the plaintiff, and in the acts complained of had been
actuated by that belief and motive. Furthermore, there was no
violence, nor any threat of violence, on the part of the defendants in
connection with any of the acts complained of, and in all matters
complained of the defendants acted without "malice" toward the
plaintiff.
This is clearly a case of the so-called secondary boycott. It is only
from such a set of facts as is stated in Bossert v. Dhuy that we can
come to a correct understanding of what a secondary boycott, in its
essence, really is, and only on such facts can we base a discussion of
10A simple strike for a closed shop is lawful in New York, National Protective

Association v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 315 (1902), approved in Bossert v. Dhuy,
supra, note 4. To similar effect is Kissam v. U. S. Printing Co. of Ohio,
i99 N. Y. 76 (i95o), holding that an agreement to employ only union men is
legal. Schwarcz v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 68
Misc. (N. Y.) 528 (igio), seems out of harmony with New York law on this
point.
'This case had not appeared in the reports at the time of the writing of this
note.
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the legality or illegality of the secondary boycott as such. Where the
element of physical violence, or threat of such violence is introduced,
or where some tort independent of the boycott itself is committed in
carrying out the boycott, then that element or independent tort gives
an illegal character to the whole affair and the status of the boycott
itself and the right to boycott are not involved. Wherever, therefore,
in this discussion we have used the expression "secondary boycott,"
we refer thereby to any situation coming squarely within the facts
of the principal case, where those directing the boycott have made no
threats of physical violence, and have not used such violence, and
where the injury to the one bovcotted is merely incidental to obtaining economic advantage for the boycotters.
Bossert v. Dhuy is the first case on the subject of the secondary
boycott to come before the Court of Appeals. The lower courts have
not been agreed as to the correct attitude to take on this subject.
We have cases holding such a boycott lega 2 and some holding it
illegal.3 But it had been clearly determined by the Court of Appeals
in NationalProtectiveAss'n. v, Cumming 4 that the strike for the closed
shop was legal. The so-called trade boycott, the boycott of one
trader by other traders as distinguished from the boycott of traders
by labor unions, was held legal in Park &' Sols v. Nat. Druggists
Ass'n. 5 It was the logical result of this state of affairs that the
Court of Appeals should take the position it did in the principal case.
The impression has become more or less general that in the great
majority of jurisdictions throughout the country the secondary boycott is illegal. But, as is pointed out in Bossert v. Dhuy, in many of
these cases there has been either violence or threats of violence and
that has obscured the real issde as to the legality of the boycott itself.
It is clear, however, that the courts of the country are widely divided
upon the subject. 6 No claim is made here that in the majority of
jurisdictions the secondary boycott, as presented in Bossert v. Dhuy
is legal. But whether this case is in the majority or the mihority it
is in accord with a great many jurisdictions outside of New York, and
in fact 7represents the trend of the modem attitude toward the
boycott.
The situation in general is best summed up by Groat in his Attitude
of American Courts in Labor Cases, as follows: "From the reading
of the many cases that deal with various phases of the boycott it
2
Cohen v. United Garment Workers of America, et at., 35 Misc. (N. Y.) 748
(igox).

'Matthews v. Shankland, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 604 (1898); Schlang v. Ladies
Waist Makers 'Union, 67 Misc. (N. Y.) 221 (1910), Seubert v. Reiff, 98 Misc.
(N. Y.) 402 (1917).
417o N. Y. 315 (1902).
5175 N. Y. i (19o3).
eCases holding the secondary boycott illegal: Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389

(I9o8); My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, ioo Md. 238 (1905). See also i CORNELL
QUARTERLY 133 and cases there cited.
7Casesholding secondary boycottlegal: Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223
(1893); Macauy Bros. v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255 (1895); Gill Engraving Co. v.
Doerr, 214 Fed. i r (1914); Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 54 Cal.
581 (19o8); Lindsay v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264 (1908);
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459 (1917). See also i CORNIELL LAW
LAW

QUARTERLY 133 and cases there cited.
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would seem clear that the legal attitude toward it is experiencing
much the same change as has occurred with the strike. Conspiracy
was the determining factor in early strikes. Though it has been
recognized in our courts from the beginning that a man might stop
work whenever he thought that by doing so he could improve his
condition, yet to act in combination with others was conspiracy.
Moreover, to quit work in such a way as to harm the employer was
readily interpreted as having for its purpose the injury of the employer
and that meant a malicious motive. Combination and motive were
the two facts of importance where early courts inflicted punishment
upon strikers. But conspiracy has been modified in its application
to strikers, and some courts have held that the motive for stopping
work is wholly immaterial. The parallel in the case of the boycott
is evident, although
the development in the case of the strike is
'8
farther advanced."
But the legal status of the boycott, in New York specifically, has
not been so fully determined that the question can be settled solely
by a reference to previously decided cases. The result must be
reached largely through a consideration of the economic and social
principles and the inherent equities involved in the case. Upon such
a basis can the secondary boycott be justified?
It is nowhere contended that it would be unlawful for an individual,
unless he were bound by contract, to withdraw his patronage from
and sever business relations with any man or group of men, at any
time, and for any reason or for no reason. Even if, in so doing, he
were actuated by malice, that would in no way affect the legality of
the act. Moreover, suppose individual A should become involved in
a dispute with B and cease to patronize him. Suppose A should then
go to B, who had nothing to do with the dispute between A and B,
and tell him that unless he also should withdraw his patronage from
B, he, C, would be deprived of the benefit of business relations with A.
Suppose that C, influenced by such "threat" or "coercion" of A,
should thereupon comply with the request of A. Would any right to
an injunction or to damages accrue to B against A? We have here a
typical case of the secondary boycott, but we have been unable to
find a decision by any court which holds that such action on the part
of A, as an individual, would be illegal.
The illegality, if there is such, in the secondary boycott must
therefore, be introduced by the organization of these individuals into
labor unions and by the fact that the boycott is maintained by these
men acting as a unit through such unions. 9 We are told that a boy
cott, when used by such a combination, becomes illegal because it is
then carried on out of malice toward the one boycotted with the
object chiefly and primarily to injure such person and only incidentally and secondarily to benefit the members of the union. It is made
effective, we are also told, by means of threats and coercion with the
result of depriving the man against whom it is directed of his rights
and damaging his property.
8G. G. Groat-Attitude of American Courts in Labor Cases, p. III.
$That it is the element of combined action that is relied on by the opponents of
the boycott to supply its illegality, see Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 321 (x894);
Quinn v. Leathern, (1gox) L. R. App. Cases (Eng.) 495.
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In the case of every effective boycott there must be some injury,
and it should be determined by the court in each particular case
whether the evidence is sufficient to show that the labor union was
actuated solely or predominantly by "malice," in the sense of a desire
to injure, or whether the main purpose was to gain legitimate economic
advantage to the members of the union with the injury to the other
parties involved in the boycott only incidental. If it is found that the
chief purpose was to injure or that the economic advantage to be
gained by the unions was not such as to justify the injury inflicted
then the acts of the union would be illegal under the doctrine of the
principal case. But the court holds in Bossert v. Dhuy that the main
purpose of a boycott having as its ultimate object the securing of the
closed shop, is to secure legitimate economic advantage, and that any
injury done to the plaintiff is only incidental and fully justified by the
economic advantage to be gained by the defendants. The evidence,
the court holds, must clearly show the "malice," if the boycott is
to be actionable; and if this element is present, it ceases to be a
boycott in the true sense of the word and becomes a conspiracy and,
as such, punishable criminally. 0
It is often said that it is the "threats" and "coercion" used in
making the secondary boycott effective that renders it illegal. What
is the gist of these "threats"? Simply this, that unless the request of
the labor union is complied with, there will be a withdrawal of patronage by the union. Is this really what one should call a "threat" or is
it simply giving a person a choice between two legitimate alternatives
to ally himself with the enemies of the union and receive their
patronage, or to ally himself with the friends of the union and receive
their patronage? Is it not a very common thing in all business and
social life that one of us should be forced to make a choice between
alliance with one group of men and alliance with another group of
men, with the advantages and disadvantages incident to such alliance?
Is there anything unethical, should there be anything illegal, in a
labor union demanding that a person or firm whom they patronize,
should take sides either with them or against them; and if he allies
himself with their opponents, is there anything unethical or illegal in
their ceasing to patronize him? Is not this so-called "coercion'
simply the exercise of legitimate economic pressure, such as we are all
subject to in our every day affairs and which we all have the right to
exercise?
But we are met with a further contention that the boycott results
in destroying property and violating property rights. A man'A
business is his property and he has a right to carry it on free trom
molestation. The boycott destroys the business and deprives him
of the right to carry it on as he pleases. But although one has a right
to carry on his business free from physical violence or molestation, he
has no right to compel any man or group to trade with him or work
for him. There is a great distinction between a man's right to carry
on a business and be ready to enter into business relations with any10
As to the application of the New York law of conspiracy, Penal Law sec. 580,
sub. 5 and 6, see i CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 133 and cases there cited. See
also, People v. Radt, 15 N.Y. Cr. R. 174 (1goo).
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body who may come to him, and a right to have a court compel a
group of men to continue business relations with him. A man may
organize a business and may conduct it as he pleases but if he conducts it in such a manner as to antagonize and make unfriendly
certain men or groups of men, should the law step in and save him
from the results of his own management of the business? The law
may guarantee a man the right to start a business, but it cannot
guarantee him success. The court in Lindsay v. Montana Federation
of Labor" answers the charge that the boycott destroys property
rights with the statement that the ones boycotted had no property
right in the trade or patronage of any indivuidal or group of individuals. If any business concern has a property right in the patronage
of its customers, then when a competitive business is started, is that
not depriving the man who was first in the field of his property rights?
It is very difficult to see how the boycott, conducted as in the principal
case, deprives a man of any "rights" or "property".
As a matter of fact the only difference between a boycott carried on
by an individual and that carried on by a group of individuals, acting
as a unit in a labor union, is that in the latter case it is more effective.
Does, then, the increase in effectiveness of the boycott affect its
legality? It is true that the damage done is greater, but in what way
does that affect the legality of the act? Is the illegality of the boycott to be determined solely in relation to the degree of damage done?
We are unable to see any logical reason why the secondary boycott,
the legality of which when carried on by an individual is unquestioned,
should become illegal when maintained by a group. With all respect
to the learned courts who have found illegality in the secondary boycott, we must, as a result, say that we are unable to find any element
of illegality in such a boycott.12
The Court of Appeals in Bossert v. Dhuy seems to qualify its
endorsement of the secondary boycott by this dictum: "in the case
now before us if the defendant had called upon the public generally to
discontinue using the plaintiff's materials and had sought to prevent
all persons by communications, written or otherwise, from dealing
with the plaintiffs, their acts would have been illegal." The court
says that such acts would have been illegal because they would carry
with them a "degree of malice as a matter of law."
What is the force of this dictum? If it is to be enforced, and is
really a part of the New York law relating to boycotts, how will the
court in later decisions interpret it? The court says that a calling
upon the public generally to assist in a boycott would carry with it
a "degree of malice as a matter of law'. This is the same as saying
that the law will infer malice from the calling upon the public
generally to join in a boycott, as contrasted with the calling personally upon all of the users of the plaintiff's goods, as in the present
case. Does the court mean that, while benefit to the members of
the union, as a result of the secondary boycott, may be shown in the
"37 Mont. 264, 273 (I9o8).
nFor a bibliography of the literature on the secondary boycott see United
States--Library of Congress-Sel. List of References on Boycotts and Injunctions
in Labor Disputes.
UI CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 133, 136.
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latter case to disprove malice, it may not be shown in the case of a
calling "upon the public generally"? May it not be argued with at
least equal reason that the more general the pressure from the
secondary boycott, the greater would the benefit be to the members
of the union, and accordingly the stronger would be the evidence
disproving malice? Furthermore, it is to be noted that the circularization in the present case was very general in its character.
But whatever we may think of this dictum, with which the court
perhaps limits its endorsement of the secondary boycott, it must be
admitted that the decision is epochmaking. The question as to
whether the boycott is a proper weapon for labor to use against
capital is one of utmost importance. The attitude of a large part of
our states toward this question has been and is still uncertain and
poorly defined. Until the Court of Appeals handed down this
decision in Bossert v. Dhuy, New York was among thosestates. Butin
this case the court has not only cleared up and made plain the law of
New York as regards the secondary boycott, but by its clearness and
decisiveness has created a precedent and an argument which should
be followed in those states where the status of the secondary boycott
has not yet been fully determined. The decision rests not only upon
sound legal precedents and authorities but is also sustained by modem
economic principles and practices. The court, sitting as a referee in
this contest between labor and capital, decides that, with the limitations herein set forth, the secondary boycott is a perfectly legitimate
weapon for labor to use. The decision must be endorsed as eminently
just and fair. It is a notice to the country that New York stands for
progress and that "present day industrial conditions sanction the
abrogation of an eighteenth century doctrine."'Is
Harry H. Hoffnagie, '17 .

